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“The Court must be living in another world. Day by day,
case by case, it is busy designing a Constitution for a
country I do not recognize.”2
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2
Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, Wabaunsee Cnty., Kan. v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 711 (1996) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (affirming that the First Amendment protects independent contractors from the termination of
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I. INTRODUCTION
As expansive as the Supreme Court’s view of the First Amendment
religion clauses has been, its jurisprudence has demonstrated that its rulings
do not always achieve the outcomes desired by proponents of religious
freedom.3 From the perspective of supporters of religious freedom, this
realization lends credence to the preceding wry comment by Justice Scalia.
This article details the Court’s inconsistent treatment of Christianity, and
people of faith broadly, especially in educational settings.
These
inconsistent judicial outcomes run the risk of increasingly marginalizing
matters of faith and conscience in the public square.4 As discussed in this
article, disputes over the status of religious freedom in the United States
continue to be litigated at a brisk pace even as Americans continue to remain
among the most religious people in the Western World.5
A long line of litigation has demonstrated the vitality, and
resiliency, of the First Amendment, even if all do not agree with the results
of the cases. A massive number of disputes have been litigated on a wide
range of issues involving religion because the meaning of “Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof . . .” is unclear.6 The Supreme Court eventually extended
the reach of the First Amendment to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment in Cantwell v. Connecticut.7 In the aftermath of Cantwell, the
3

For example, in the first of a pair of seemingly paradoxical rulings during the same term, the
Supreme Court ignored the rights of a minority religion in upholding the dismissal of drug counselors
who ingested peyote as part of a sacramental ritual in the Native American Church, a legally organized
religious movement that was recognized by the federal government and various states; the Court ruled
that generally applicable, religion-neutral laws that have the effect of burdening a particular religious
practice need not be justified by a compelling government interest. Emp’t Div., Dep't of Human Res. of
Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 885–86 (1990). Concomitantly, in Board of Education of Westside
Community Schools v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 253 (1990), the Court protected the rights of Christian
students to organize prayer and Bible study clubs in secondary schools in upholding the constitutionality
of the Equal Access Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 4071–4074 (2006). Bd. of Educ. of Westside Cmty. Schs. v.
Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 253 (1990) (stipulating that officials in public secondary schools receiving
federal financial assistance which permit non-curriculum related student groups to meet during noninstructional time cannot deny access to groups due to the religious, political, philosophical, or other
content of their speech; officials can exclude groups if their meetings materially and substantially
interfere with the orderly conduct of school activities). For an analysis of these two cases, see generally
David L. Gregory & Charles J. Russo, Let Us Pray (But Not “Them”!): The Troubled Jurisprudence of
Religious Liberty. 65 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 273 (1991).
4
As this article heads to press, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in another dispute over the
place, if any, of religion in the public market. Town of Greece v. Galloway, 681 F.3d 20 (2d Cir. 2012),
cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 2388 (2013) (over whether a town board can open its meetings with prayer).
For a news report on the oral arguments, see, e.g., Matthew Lounsberry, Justices Debate Attorneys Over
Court's Role in Public Prayer: Town Residents Take Issue With Christians, WASH. TIMES (D.C.), Nov. 7,
2013, at A01, available at 2013 WLNR 28083068.
5
For a comprehensive study on church attendance, see Olav Aarts et al., Does Duration of
Deregulated Religious Markets Affect Church Attendance? Evidence from 26 Religious Markets in
Europe and North America Between 1981 and 2006, 49 J. SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF RELIGION 657, 669 tbl.4
(2010).
6
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
7
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 306–11 (1940) (reversing the convictions of Jehovah’s
Witnesses for violating a statute against the solicitation of funds for religious, charitable, or philanthropic
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establishment and free exercise of religion protections afforded by the First
Amendment restrained both the federal government and the states.8 These
religion clauses have generated a greater amount of litigation involving
religion, in particular, at the Supreme Court level than any other issue
involving schooling. In addition, lower federal and state courts have
resolved a plethora of cases involving religion issues and education both in
K-129 and higher education10 settings.
The vast range of legal issues arising under the religion clauses can
be categorized under two broad, occasionally overlapping, lines of cases in
which the Justices have often relied on the metaphor calling for a wall of
separation between church and state.11 In the first of these two lines of First
Amendment cases, the Supreme Court is generally favorably disposed
toward allowing public financial aid to be made available to religiouslyaffiliated, non-public primary and secondary schools12 and their students as
purposes without prior approval of public officials). But cf. Barron v. Mayor and City Council of
Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243, 250–51 (1833) (holding that the Bill of Rights was inapplicable to the states
since its history demonstrated that it was limited to the federal government).
8
Although issues associated with the practice of religion are more likely to be covered by the Free
Exercise Clause, such disputes are often referred to as Establishment Clause disputes.
9
See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 602 (1971). Lemon is arguably the most significant
religion case, certainly in the context of elementary and secondary education. For a discussion of Lemon,
see infra note 14 and accompanying text.
10
See infra note 13 and accompanying text.
11
The “wall of separation” metaphor (with which the author disagrees) is typically credited to
Thomas Jefferson's letter of January 1, 1802 to Nehemiah Dodge, Ephraim Robbins, and Stephen S.
Nelson, A Committee of the Danbury Baptist Association, 16 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON at 281
(Andrew Adgate Lipscomb & Albert Ellery Bergh, eds. 1903). Jefferson wrote:
Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely between man and his
God . . . I contemplate with sovereign reverence that act of the whole American
people which declared that their legislature should ‘make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,’ thus building a
wall of separation between church and state.
16 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON at 281 (Andrew Adgate Lipscomb & Albert Ellery Bergh, eds.
1903).
The Supreme Court first used the term in Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878)
(rejecting a Free Exercise Clause challenge to a federal polygamy statute). For an alternative view on
Jefferson’s perspectives, see Charles J. Russo, Judicial “hostility to all things religious in public life” or
Healthy Separation of Religion and Public Education? 35 RELIGION & EDUC. NO. 2, 78 (2008) (noting in
part that “Jefferson was neither hostile to nor sought to exclude the teachings of Jesus, and by extension,
religion entirely from the marketplace of ideas, even though he called for separation between Church and
State” insofar as he acknowledged the value of the teachings of Christ). However, the “wall of
separation” metaphor originated with Roger Williams who coined the term more than 150 years before it
was appropriate by Jefferson. Roger Williams, Mr. Cotton's Letter Lately Printed, Examined and
Answered (1644), reprinted in 1 THE COMPLETE WRITINGS OF ROGER WILLIAMS 392 (1963) (“and that
when they have opened a gap in the hedge or wall of Separation between the Garden of the Church and
the Wildernes[s] of the world. . . . ”).
12
The Supreme Court's modern Establishment Clause jurisprudence with regard to state aid in the
context of K–12 education evolved through three phases. During the first phase, which began in 1947
with Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947) (upholding a statute permitting
reimbursement to parents for costs associated with sending their children to their religiously affiliated
non-public schools) and ended in 1968 with Board of Education of Central School District No. 1 v. Allen,
392 U.S. 236, 248–49 (1968) (upholding the loans of textbooks to students who attended religiously
affiliated nonpublic schools), the Court enunciated the Child Benefit Test, a legal construct permitting
publicly funded aid because it assists children rather than their religiously affiliated non-public schools.
Bd. of Ed. of Cent. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Allen U.S. 236, 243 (1968). The second phase, which began with
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well as to institutions of higher learning,13 a topic that is beyond the scope of
this article. In these cases, the Court more often than not applies the
tripartite test that the Justices enunciated in Lemon v. Kurtzman.14 This onesize-fits-all measure for disputes involving religion15 is used regardless of
whether disputes involve aid, religious activities such as prayer, or who can
serve as ecclesiastical leaders.
In the second line of cases involving the free exercise of religion,
the majority of disputes took place in primary and secondary schools, with
the Supreme Court fairly consistently applying the separationist perspective.
In these cases the Justices prohibited such school-sponsored religious
activities in K-12 settings as prayer16 and Bible reading17 at the start of the
day, at graduations,18 or at sporting events19 in addition to forbidding
the Court's 1971 judgment in Lemon and its 1985 judgment in Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985),
represented the nadir of the Child Benefit Test in the eyes of its proponents as the Court largely refused
to move beyond the limits it created in Everson and Allen. The Court’s 1993 ruling in Zobrest v.
Catalina Foothills School District, 509 U.S. 1 (1993) breathed new life into the Child Benefit Test,
allowing it to enter the third phase that extends to the present. Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist.,
509 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1993) (permitting the on-site delivery of special education services in religiously
affiliated non-public schools).
13
See, e.g., Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 689 (1971) (handed down on the same day as
Lemon, largely upholding the Higher Education Facilities Act of 1963, a statute making federal funds
available to religiously affiliated institutions of higher learning for construction of facilities); Hunt v.
McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 749 (1973) (maintaining that insofar as religion was not pervasive in an
institution, South Carolina was free to issue revenue bonds to benefit the church-related college because
it did not guarantee the returns on the investment with public funds).
14
Under this test:
Every analysis in this area must begin with consideration of the cumulative criteria
developed by the Court over many years. Three such tests may be gleaned from
our cases. First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its
principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion;
finally, the statute must not foster “an excessive government entanglement with
religion.”
Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612–13 (internal citations omitted). Further, in examining entanglement and state aid
to religiously affiliated institutions, the Court identified three additional factors to be taken into
consideration: “we must examine the character and purposes of the institutions that are benefited, the
nature of the aid that the State provides, and the resulting relationship between the government and
religious authority.” Id. at 615.
15
In addition to Lemon, the Court has applied two other tests. The “endorsement test” asks whether
the purpose of a governmental action is to endorse or approve of a religion or religious activity. Lynch v.
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687–89 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (upholding the display of a crèche on
public property). The Court has also articulated a “psychological coercion test.” Lee v. Weisman, 505
U.S. 577, 592 (1992) (disallowing prayer at a public school graduation). See also Santa Fe Indep. Sch.
Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 306–10 (2000) (using both tests to invalidate a school district’s policy
sanctioning student-led prayer prior to a high school football game).
16
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 424 (1962).
17
Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp., Pa. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225–27 (1963).
18
Tanford v. Brand, 104 F.3d 982, 984–85 (7th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 814 (1997); see
also Chaudhuri v. Tennessee, 130 F.3d 232, 239–240 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1024 (1998)
(refusing to intervene in cases invalidating prayer at graduation ceremonies of public universities as they
did not involve young students and attendance was voluntary). Contra Lee, 505 U.S. at 609; see also
Tilton, 403 U.S. at 676 (upholding, on the same day as Lemon, the Higher Education Facilities Act of
1963, a statute making federal funds available to religiously affiliated institutions of higher learning for
construction of facilities); see also Hunt, 413 U.S. at 749 (maintaining that insofar as religion was not
pervasive in an institution, South Carolina was free to issue revenue bonds to benefit the church-related
college because it did not guarantee the returns on the investment with public funds).
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educators from posting the Ten Commandments in public school
classrooms.20 At the same time, the Court deferred to parents who wished to
have their children released from their public schools early in order to
receive religious instruction at other locations21 and allowed students to
organize prayer and Bible study clubs during non-instructional hours.22
It cannot be denied that the Supreme Court has given the religion
clauses expansive interpretations. Yet, ongoing religious controversies in an
increasingly secular American society23 seem to suggest that the judiciary
has “taken sides in the culture war, departing from its role of assuring, as
neutral observer, that the democratic rules of engagement are observed”24 in
a way that imperils religious liberty. At present, a wide variety of religious
disputes continue to swirl around the United States. The judicial disposition
of these controversies has the potential to alter the fundamental calculus of
religious freedom as applied to educational institutions and other faith-based
facilities such as hospitals and private employers. The outcome of these
disputes threatens to turn the First Amendment on its proverbial ear by
limiting the free exercise of religion in an array of circumstances. Rather
than rehash the well-examined lines of litigation in order to demonstrate the
direction that judicial interpretations of the freedom of religion have
protected, this article begins by examining two recent but disparate Supreme
Court cases, handed down about a year apart, in which the Justices reached
apparently irreconcilable positions before turning to a discussion of the
status of religious freedom.
In the first dispute, Christian Legal Society v. Martinez (“CLS”), a
bitterly divided Supreme Court affirmed that officials at a public law school
in California could implement a policy requiring an on-campus religious
group to admit all comers from the student body, including those who
disagreed with its beliefs, as a condition to becoming a recognized student
organization.25 The second case, Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran
Church and School v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(“Hosanna-Tabor”), resulted in a rare unanimous judgment in which the
Court rejected the claim of the EEOC in a dispute with a Lutheran school in
Missouri.26 In so ruling, the Court upheld the ministerial exception, which
19
Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 530 U.S. at 317. Interestingly, the Court chose not to address the
status of student-led prayer at public school graduation ceremonies. Id. at 301.
20
Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 42–43 (1980).
21
See Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 315 (1952).
22
Bd. of Educ. of Westside Cmty. Sch. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 251–52 (1990).
23
CARY FUNK & GREG SMITH, “NONES” ON THE RISE: ONE-IN-FIVE ADULTS HAVE NO RELIGIOUS
AFFILIATION 9 (2012) (reporting on the decline in religious membership in the United States), available
at http://www.pewforum.org/files/2012/10/NonesOnTheRise-full.pdf.
24
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 602–03 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (commenting on the
Court’s majority opinion, which invalidated a state sodomy law applied to consenting adults).
25
Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2978–82 (2010), reh’g denied on remand sub
nom. Christian Legal Soc'y v. Wu, 626 F.3d 483 (9th Cir. 2010).
26
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 707, 710 (2012).
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arose under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.27 This exception
allows “a religious corporation, association, educational institution, or
society with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion
to perform work connected with the carrying on by such corporation,
association, educational institution, or society of its activities” as long as
organizational officials can demonstrate that doing so is justified by a bona
fide occupational qualification (“BFOQ”).28 Notably, the claim arose under
the Americans with Disabilities Act29 rather than Title VII.30 Even so, in
upholding religious liberty, the Court agreed that church leaders and, by
extension, officials of faith-based institutions in general, retain the freedom
to apply their religious values in making hiring decisions as to who can
serve as or be identified as ministers.31
These two cases—one restricting religious freedom, the other
protecting this essential right—reflect the growing tension as the United
States finds itself at a fork in the road. The direction that the Supreme Court
takes at this fork in the road will lead either to the strengthening of the longheld respect for religious freedom, a defining hallmark of American society,
or lead to its diminishment. In this regard, religious freedom in the United
States faces perhaps its greatest existential statutory and regulatory threats
imposed by the federal government in light of the health mandates imposed
by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act32 championed by
President Obama, a topic that is discussed in more detail below.
Against this backdrop, the remainder of this article is divided into
two substantive parts. The first section reviews the judicial analyses in CLS
and Hosanna-Tabor to frame the current controversy on the status of
religious freedom in the United States. The second part reflects on the
effects of these cases and recent developments regarding the religion clauses
of the First Amendment in relation to interrelated questions. Some of these
questions are in the early stages of what promise to be lengthy judicial
battles, most notably with regard to the health care mandate, involving the
religious freedom of institutional employers, their employees, and students.
The article takes the position that there are individuals and groups
who would like to impose their will by neutering, if not eliminating,
organized religion, mainstream Christianity as represented by the Roman
27

Id. at 705.
42 U.S.C § 2000e–1 (2006).
29
42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12377 (2006). For a full discussion of this far-reaching statute, see generally
CHARLES J. RUSSO & ALLAN G. OSBORNE, SECTION 504 OF THE REHABILITATION ACT OF 1973 AND THE
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT: IMPLICATIONS FOR EDUCATIONAL LEADERS (Corwin Press 2009).
30
Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 701.
31
For a comprehensive treatment of legal issues involving American non-public schools, see
generally RALPH D. MAWDSLEY, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF RELIGIOUS AND PRIVATE SCHOOLS (6th Ed.
2012).
32
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010); see also
Healthcare and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029.
28
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Catholic Church, in particular, as an independent institution devoted to
bringing about social and spiritual good in the public marketplace. The
article finishes with a brief conclusion suggesting that, as these issues play
out, the future of religious freedom in the United States hangs in the balance
as the nation stands at a precipitous fork in the road with the option of either
confirming or dismantling this deeply cherished first freedom.
II. RECENT SUPREME COURT CASES
INVOLVING THE RELIGION CLAUSES
A. Christian Legal Society v. Martinez
1. Background
At issue in CLS was a disagreement that occurred on the campus of
Hastings College of the Law, an institution in the University of California
system, over its policy governing official recognition to on-campus student
groups.33 Recognized student organizations (RSOs) at Hastings are granted
access to the use of the institutional name and logo along with access to
funds, facilities, and channels of communication.34 In return, RSOs must
comply with the college’s nondiscrimination policy, which, consistent with
California state law, forbids discrimination on an array of criteria including
religion and sexual orientation.35 Hastings officials interpreted this policy as
requiring RSOs to accept “all comers,” meaning that they must allow all
students to join and seek leadership positions regardless of their status or
beliefs and whether these are consonant with organizational goals.36
The dispute giving rise to the litigation in CLS arose at the start of
the 2004-05 academic year when the Hastings campus branch of the
Christian Legal Society (“Society”) chose to affiliate with the national group
and adopted its bylaws including the requirement that members and officers
sign a “Statement of Faith.”37 This statement directs Society members to
comply with its principles such as the belief that sexual activity should not
occur outside of marriage between a man and a woman, whether
heterosexual or homosexual.38 The Society interprets its bylaws as
excluding anyone from affiliation for engaging in “unrepentant homosexual
conduct” or for having religious convictions different from those detailed in
its Statement of Faith.39
Hastings officials rejected the Society’s application to acquire status
33
34
35
36
37
38
39

Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2978–81 (2010).
Id. at 2979.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2980.
Id.
Id.
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as an RSO because its organizational bylaws differed from the school’s “allcomers” policy by excluding students based on religion and sexual
orientation.40 Officials thus prohibited the Society from meeting on campus
and using school resources. The Society sought to enjoin enforcement of
Hastings’ policy, alleging that compliance would have violated its rights to
speech, association, and religion.41 In refusing to enjoin the policy, a federal
trial court in California decreed that the “all-comers” condition in the policy
was reasonable and viewpoint neutral.42 The court added that the policy did
not impermissibly impair the Society's right to expressive association and
was not unacceptable because it did not require the group to admit members
or limit speech.43 The court posited that, if anything, the policy merely
placed conditions on the use of school facilities and funds.44 The court
rejected the Society’s free exercise claim and maintained that the neutral,
generally applicable policy did not single out religious beliefs for different
treatment.45
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed that the “all-comers” policy
was reasonable and viewpoint neutral.46 Since the Ninth Circuit’s judgment
in CLS directly conflicted with a case from Indiana in which the Seventh
Circuit upheld the rights of another campus branch of the Society to apply
its membership rules, the Court agreed to hear an appeal to resolve this
split.47
2. Supreme Court Analysis
a. Majority
In a five-to-four judgment, a bitterly divided Supreme Court
affirmed that the “all-comers” policy was constitutional.48 Writing for the
40

Id. at 2980–81. “As far as the record reflects, Ms. Chapman [Director of Hastings' Office of
Student Services] made no mention of an accept-all-applicants policy” when CLS applied for registration
as a RSO. Id. at 3002 (Alito, J., dissenting). Moreover, “[a] few days later, three officers of the chapter
met with Ms. Chapman, and she reiterated that the CLS bylaws did not comply with ‘the religion and
sexual orientation provisions of the Nondiscrimination Policy and that they would need to be amended in
order for CLS to become a registered student organization.’ . . . On both of these occasions, it appears
that not a word was said about an accept-all-comers policy.” Id. (internal citations omitted).
41
Id. at 2981.
42
Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of Univ. of Cal. v. Kane, No. C 04-04484, JSW, 2006 WL
997217, at *13–14 (N.D. Cal. May 19, 2006), aff’d sub nom. Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of Univ. of
Cal. v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010).
43
Id. at *16.
44
Id.
45
Id. at *26.
46
Christian Legal Soc’y v. Kane, 319 Fed. App’x. 645, 646 (9th Cir. 2009).
47
Christian Legal Soc’y v. Walker, 453 F.3d 853, 867 (7th Cir. 2006). For a commentary on this
case, see Charles J. Russo & William E. Thro, The Constitutional Rights of Politically Incorrect Groups:
Christian Legal Society v. Walker as an Illustration, 33 J.C.U.L. 361 (2007).
48
Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of Univ. of Cal. v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 29712995–3000 (2010).
See William E. Thro & Charles J. Russo, A Serious Setback for Freedom: The Implications of Christian
Legal Society v. Martinez, 261 EDUC. L. REP. 473 (2010), for a much more detailed commentary on this
case.
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majority, Justice Ginsburg was joined by Justices Stevens, Kennedy, Breyer,
and Sotomayor.49 At the outset of its opinion, the majority was reluctant to
deny access to campus facilities to student groups based on their
viewpoints.50 The Court acknowledged that it faced a novel question and
framed the issue as whether “a public law school [may] condition its official
recognition of a student group-and the attendant use of school funds and
facilities-on the organization’s agreement to open eligibility for membership
and leadership to all students?”51
After recounting the facts, in what the Supreme Court categorized
access to facilities as a subsidy, the majority began its analysis by
combining the Society’s freedom of speech and association claims in light
of the Court’s limited public forum jurisprudence.52 In this regard, the Court
failed to provide sufficient detail for those who are less familiar with the
law. It is worth noting that in reviewing First Amendment claims, the
Justices have identified three different forums.53 The government’s
regulatory power is most restricted in traditional public forums, such as
parks, streets, and sidewalks.54 This was inapplicable in CLS. The Court
found that the non-public forum doctrine, the second forum, which typically
applies in classrooms that are “not by tradition or designation a forum for
public communication,” was equally inapplicable.55
As to the third forum, the Supreme Court held that the appropriate
standard was that of a “limited public forum,” property that the state, qua
Hastings, opened for public use as a place for expressive activity.56 The
Court recognized that officials at public institutions can create such a forum
either by express policy or by practice.57 Following its review of cases in
which the majority applied this analysis, the Court interpreted the “allcomers” policy as reasonable for two reasons:58 First, the Justices were of
the view that insofar as they ordinarily granted deference to educational
leaders, school officials had the authority to establish such a policy.59
Second, the Court divined that the reasons school officials provided for
initiating the policy—such as affording leadership opportunities for
students, forbidding discrimination based on status, and bringing individuals
of all types together—were constitutional because they were legitimate and
49

Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2977.
Id. at 2978.
Id.
52
Id. at 2985.
53
See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266–67 (1988); Perry Educ. Ass’n v.
Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983) (discussing forum analysis).
54
Perry 460 U.S. at 45.
55
Id. at 46.
56
Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2984.
57
Id. at 2986.
58
Id. at 2989–91.
59
Id. at 2988–89.
50
51
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non-discriminatory.60
The Supreme Court determined that based on the off-campus
alternative channels that were available to the Society after it lost its status
as an RSO, the policy was reasonable.61 The Court next rejected the
Society’s concerns “as more hypothetical than real” that if it had to comply
with the policy there would be no diversity of perspectives on campus and
that individuals who were hostile to it could infiltrate its ranks in order to
subvert its mission.62 The majority held that insofar as the policy allowed
clubs to condition eligibility for membership and leadership positions on
such qualifications as attendance at meetings, dues payment, and other
neutral criteria, the Society’s concerns were unfounded.63
In concluding that the “all-comers” policy was constitutional, the
Supreme Court remanded CLS for further consideration.64 The Justices
indicated that, since the lower courts failed to address whether Hastings
officials selectively enforced the “all-comers” policy, the Ninth Circuit had
to consider the extent to which the Society´s argument may have still been
viable.65
b. Concurrences
Justices Stevens and Kennedy wrote separate concurrences. Justice
Stevens, in the final case of his almost thirty-five years on High Court,
authored a brief opinion in which he sought to rebut Justice Alito’s dissent,
which would have invalidated the policy as unconstitutional.66 Justice
Stevens responded that while the Society had the right to limit membership
off campus, the First Amendment does not require Hastings’ policy to
permit the same.67 In briefer concurrence, Justice Kennedy asserted that law
school officials and the Society stipulated that there was no evidence of
viewpoint discrimination in the policy.68 Even so, he observed that the
result may have been different had the Society been able to prove that the
“all-comers” policy was designed or employed to infiltrate its membership
or challenge its leadership in an attempt to stifle its perspective, an issue that
may well arise in future litigation.69

60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69

Id. at 2989–91.
Id. at 2991.
Id. at 2992.
Id.
Id. at 2995.
Id.
Id. at 2995 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Id. at 2996.
Id. at 2999 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id. at 3000.
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c. Dissent
Justice Alito, joined by Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Scalia, and
Justice Thomas, dissented vociferously.70 At the outset of his lengthy
dissent, Justice Alito expressed his concern that the majority imposed a
significant restriction on religious freedom, especially since law school
officials had not relied on the “all-comers” policy until the Christian group
initiated its claims.71 Alito also remarked that the policy unreasonably
infringed on the rights of those who were active in the organization because
it placed a substantial burden on the religious freedom of the Society’s
members, but no other group in a limited public forum that was supposed to
be viewpoint neutral.72
3. Remand
On remand, in a fairly brief opinion, the Ninth Circuit rejected
Society’s remaining claims that Hastings officials violated their right to
religious freedom.73 The court refused to permit Society’s case to proceed,
because its leaders failed to preserve their argument that university officials
selectively applied the policy.74 The court thus contended that the Society
was not entitled to “a second bite at the appellate apple.” 75
B. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission
1. Background
The dispute in Hosanna-Tabor began when officials at a Lutheran
elementary school in Michigan dismissed a “called” minister, rather than
“contract” teacher. 76 In order to be eligible to serve in the higher role of
“called” teachers, individuals are hired by voting members of the HosannaTabor Lutheran Church congregation on the recommendations of its Boards
of Education, Elders, and Directors.77 Teachers who are “called” have to
complete “colloquy” classes required by the Lutheran Church-Missouri
Synod that focus on various aspects of the Christian faith.78 Having
completed their colloquies, qualified teachers receive certificates of
70

Id. at 3000–01 (Alito, J., dissenting).
Id. at 3000.
Id. at 3013.
73
Christian Legal Soc’y v. Wu, 626 F.3d 483, 488 (9th Cir. 2010).
74
Id. at 485.
75
Id. at 488 (quoting Kesselring v. F/T Arctic Hero, 95 F.3d 23, 24 (9th Cir. 1996) (per curiam)).
76
EEOC v. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch., 582 F. Supp. 2d 881, 883 (E.D.
Mich. 2008). For a more recent case involving another Lutheran school where the court relied on
Hosanna-Tabor, see Herzog v. St. Peter Lutheran Church, 884 F. Supp. 2d 668, 672–74 (N.D. Ill. 2012)
(rejecting a teacher’s age, sex, and marital status as precluded by the ministerial exception).
77
Hosanna-Tabor, 582 F. Supp. 2d at 883.
78
Id.
71
72
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admission into both the teaching ministry and the Michigan District of the
Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod; doing so means that Synod officials
helped teacher candidates find jobs by placing their names on a list provided
to schools in need of educators.79 Teachers who are selected for jobs are
named “commissioned ministers” and work on open-ended contracts and
cannot be dismissed without cause.80 Such teachers also have the chance to
obtain special housing allowances on their income taxes as long as they
engage in activities related to their ministries.81
Here, the teacher filed suit against the school claiming that officials
dismissed her in retaliation for her threat to take legal action after she
refused to resign in a disagreement over whether she could return to work
due to her health problems, which included sleep apnea.82 As part of her
claim, the teacher alleged that she was not a minister because she spent
more than six hours of her seven-hour work day teaching secular subjects
from secular textbooks which did not incorporate religion.83
In the first round of litigation, a federal trial court granted the
school’s motion for summary judgment in applying the ministerial exception
to the case.84 On appeal, the Sixth Circuit vacated the judgment in favor of
the teacher, finding she was not a ministerial employee and that the claims
of officials that her ADA discrimination charges involved church doctrine
did not require judicial evaluation or interpretation of religious doctrine.85
The Court granted certiorari86 and, in turn, reversed in favor of school
officials, upholding the ministerial exception.87
2. Supreme Court Analysis
a. Majority Opinion
As a possible sign of how significantly he viewed Hosanna-Tabor,
Chief Justice John Roberts authored the Court’s unanimous opinion.88 After
reviewing the facts and judicial history of the case, the Supreme Court cited
the First Amendment religion clauses in full, remarking that although there
79
80
81
82
83
84
85

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 882–83.
Id. at 882–84.
Id. at 883.
EEOC v. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch., 597 F.3d 769, 779–82 (6th Cir.

2010).
86

Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012).
Id. at 710.
88
Id. at 699. The analysis of Hosanna-Tabor herein is adapted from a lengthier commentary on this
case that focused on its application to higher education. See Charles J. Russo & Paul E. McGreal,
Religious Freedom in American Catholic Higher Education. 39 RELIGION & EDUC. 116 (2012); see also
Ralph D. Mawdsley & Allan G. Osborne, Jr., Shout Hosanna: The Supreme Court Affirms the Free
Exercise Clause's Ministerial Exception, 278 EDUC. L. REP. 693 (2012).
87
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can sometimes be conflict between these clauses, there was none here
because both forbid governmental interference with the determinations of
church leaders over who can serve as ministers.89
At the outset of it substantive analysis, the Supreme Court traced the
history of religious freedom in the Anglo-American context from the Magna
Carta in 1215 through the Founding Fathers and its own precedent.90 Still,
the Court commented that “[u]ntil today, we have not had occasion to
consider whether this freedom of a religious organization to select its
ministers is implicated by a suit alleging discrimination in employment.”91
At the same time, Justices conceded that the federal circuit courts had
litigated the issue extensively since the enactment of Title VII.92 Reasoning
that the ministerial exception is grounded in the First Amendment, the
Court, rejecting arguments from the EEOC and Justice Department to the
contrary, agreed that the exception should remain in place because the
government has no place interfering with internal church operations.93
The Supreme Court found that the ministerial exception is rooted in
the First Amendment, deciding that the exception applied to bar the
teacher’s ADA claim.94 The Justices pointed out that they agreed with
circuit court cases which extended the exception beyond the leaders of
religious congregations to teachers.95 The Court observed that officials
treated the plaintiff as a minister because she underwent six years of
religious training, and even if she did not teach religion most of the day, she
held herself out as a minister.96
The Supreme Court reviewed what it identified as the Sixth
Circuit’s three errors in its rationale.97 First, the Court specified that the
Sixth Circuit undervalued the plaintiff’s title as minister.98 Second, the
Court was convinced that the Sixth Circuit placed too much emphasis on the
fact that other teachers performed many of the same duties as the plaintiff.99
Third, the Court emphasized that the Sixth Circuit improperly focused on
the fact that the plaintiff-teacher spent a significant part of her workday
engaged in secular duties.100
Categorizing the perspective of the EEOC, but not the Sixth Circuit,
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100

Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 702.
Id. at 702–05.
Id. at 705.
Id.
Id. at 702.
Id. at 707.
Id. at 707–09.
Id.
Id. at 708.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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as “extreme,”101 even though it disagreed with the latter’s focus on how
much time the plaintiff spent on secular tasks, the Supreme Court described
the issue as “not one that can be resolved by a stopwatch.”102 In other
words, the Court was not swayed by how many hours the teacher devoted to
secular, as opposed to religious, duties in carrying out her job. Since it
believed that the teacher was an ordained minister within the meaning of the
ministerial exception, the Court ruled that church officials could terminate
her employment regardless of how much time she spent on secular
responsibilities.103
Rounding out its analysis, the Supreme Court acknowledged that the
plaintiff and EEOC no longer sought her reinstatement, preferring to request
front pay, back pay, other damages, and attorney fees.104 Even so, the Court
rejected these requests because they would have essentially have penalized
the church in violation of the First Amendment.105 Refusing to examine
wider questions of employment discrimination, the Court concluded that
“we hold only that the ministerial exception bars such a suit” as the teacher
filed against her religious employer.106 As such, the Court reversed the
judgment of the Sixth Circuit and entered a judgment in favor of the
church.107
b. Concurrences
Justice Thomas, in a brief two-paragraph concurrence, would have
gone further than the majority insofar as he would have deferred to religious
officials in all matters over who is a minister.108 Justice Alito, joined by
Justice Kagan, indicated that the definition of what a minister is should be
left to religious groups so that civil courts do not have to be asked to
interpret church doctrine.109
3. Later Developments
On the same day that it handed down Hosanna-Tabor, the Supreme
Court rejected two additional challenges to the ministerial exception.110
Although these cases are of no precedential value, they do add to the
101

Id. at 709.
Id.
Id. at 708–09.
104
Id. at 709.
105
Id.
106
Id. at 710.
107
Id.
108
Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
109
Id. at 715–16 (Alito, J., concurring).
110
See Skrzypczak v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Tulsa, 611 F.3d 1238, 1246 (10th Cir. 2010), cert.
denied, 132 S. Ct. 1088 (2012); Weishuhn v. Catholic Diocese of Lansing, 756 N.W.2d 483, 486–87
(Mich. Ct. App. 2008), appeal after remand, 787 N.W.2d 513 (Mich. Ct. App. 2010), appeal denied, 787
N.W.2d 507 (Mich. 2010), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1088 (2012).
102
103

2013]

FORK IN THE ROAD

377

viability of the ministerial exception. In the first case, the Director of the
Department of Religious Formation unsuccessfully sued the Roman
Catholic Diocese of Tulsa, Oklahoma, for gender and age discrimination
after being dismissed from her position.111 In the second case, the Justices
declined to hear the appeal in a dispute wherein a Director of Religious
Education, who also taught mathematics, sued the Roman Catholic Diocese
of Lansing after having alleged violations of the state’s Whistleblowers'
Protection Act and Civil Rights Act for retaliatory dismissal over charges
unrelated to her duties as a religious educator.112 In both instances, the
Court agreed that the employees could not proceed because they were
subject to the ministerial exception.113
III. DISCUSSION
Whether the attitude of the Supreme Court, and the American
judiciary in general, reveals support for a healthy separation of church and
state or, as reflected in Chief Justice Rehnquist’s scathing dissent in Santa
Fe Independent School District v. Doe, a case invalidating student-led
prayer prior to the start of high school football games, an attitude “bristl[ing]
with hostility to all things religious in public life,”114 is, of course, in large
part, in the eye of the beholder.115
On the one hand, from a Christian perspective, and other people of
faith, believers could easily view the reality as closer to hostility in light of
some recent cases. For example, the Ninth Circuit rejected a challenge to
Islamic religious practices in a social studies class in a public school in
California.116 Also, the Second Circuit refused to disturb a policy permitting
111

Skrzypczak, 611 F.3d at 1240–41.
Weishuhn, 756 N.W.2d at 486–87.
Id. at 486; Skrzypzak 611 F.3d at 1243–46. See Erdman v. Chapel Hill Presbyterian Church, 286
P.3d 357, 360–67 (Wash. 2012) (relying partially on Hosanna-Tabor and rejecting the negligent
supervision and retention claims that a church’s former executive for stewardship - chief financial officer
filed against the minister who supervised her work on the basis that civil courts must accept the rulings of
hierarchical church governing bodies on questions of discipline, faith, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or
law).
114
Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 318 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
115
For a commentary on the role of the judiciary, particularly as it relates to schooling, see Charles J.
Russo, Judges as Umpires or Rule Makers? The Role of the Judiciary in Educational Decision Making in
the United States. 10 EDUC. L.J. 33 (2009).
116
Eklund v. Byron Union Sch. Dist., 154 F. App’x. 648, at *1 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 549
U.S. 942 (2006). At issue were materials including a simulation unit on Islamic culture in a social studies
class that, among other things, required students to wear identification tags displaying their new Islamic
names, dress as Muslims, memorize and recite an Islamic prayer that has the status of the Lord’s Prayer
in Christianity as well as other verses from the Qur’an, recite the Five Pillars of Faith, and engage in
fasting and acts of self-denial. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Eklund v. Byron Union Sch. Dist., No. 051539, 2006 WL 1519184, at *2–12 (U.S. May 31, 2006). Without addressing the merits of the claims, the
court declared that the activities “‘were not . . . ‘overt religious exercises’ that raise[d] Establishment
Clause concerns.’” Eklund, 154 F. App’x. at *1 (quoting Brown v. Woodland Joint Unified Sch. Dist., 27
F.3d 1373, 1382 (9th Cir. 1994) to affirm that a curricular program did not violate the Establishment
Clause or California Constitution because the classroom activities in which children discussed witches,
created poetic chants, and pretended they were sorcerers did not equate to practicing or endorsing the
“religion” of witchcraft).
112
113
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educators in public schools in New York City to display a menorah along
with a star and crescent in classrooms during the Christmas season, but not a
manger scene.117 In the wake of these two illustrative cases, not to mention
CLS, it may be difficult to avoid such an interpretation, at least with regard
to Christianity.
On the other hand, from the perspective of proponents of religious
freedom generally, it might be possible to view cases of this nature as
allowing at least some religion in the public sphere in the United States,
albeit in a way that arguably treats the dominant tradition, Christianity,
differently from other faiths.118 Again, what the cases really demonstrate is
that the interpretation one reaches largely depends on one’s perspective.
In order to provide some framing of where the judiciary stands on
the place of religion in the public square following the recent Supreme
Court cases, this section considers three overlapping threats to religious
freedom in the United States. The first part reflects on how religious
institutions and private employers, two different groups that may not
ultimately be treated the same, can preserve their faith-based identities when
possibly being required to act against their consciences, in having to comply
with the federal health care mandates (a proposition which a plurality of
Americans reject as a threat to religious freedom)119 and recognize same-sex
unions.
The conundrum associated with issues relating to religious freedom
are all the more perplexing because granting conscience-based exceptions
has deep roots in American history. In fact, the earliest example to what can
be described as a conscience exemption, as applied to religious freedom,
occurred in 1621 during the earliest days in the Plymouth Colony.120 This
117

Skoros v. City of New York, 437 F.3d 1, 25 (2d Cir. 2006). For an analysis of this case, see
generally Charles J. Russo, Of Baby Jesus and the Easter Bunny: Does Christianity Still Have a Place in
the Educational Marketplace of Ideas in the United States? 16 EDUC. & L.J. 61 (2006).
118
Amid ongoing disputes over its place in public life, Christianity remains by far the dominant
religious tradition in the United States. See Frank Newport, In U.S., 77% Identify as Christian: Eighteen
percent have no explicit religious identity, GALLUP.COM (Dec. 24, 2012), http://www.gallup.com/
poll/159548/identify-christian.aspx (“The large majority of Americans -- 77% of the adult population -identify with a Christian religion, including 52% who are Protestants or some other non-Catholic
Christian religion, 23% who are Catholic, and 2% who affiliate with the Church of Jesus Christ of LatterDay Saints. Another 18% of Americans do not have an explicit religious identity and 5% identify with a
non-Christian religion.”).
119
See 46% Favor Allowing Religious Exemption for Contraceptive Mandate, 41% Oppose (Dec. 5,
2012), RASMUSSEN REPORTS, http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/politics/current_events/
healthcare/december_2012/46_favor_allowing_religious_exemption_for_contraceptive_mandate_41_op
pose.
120
The dispute in Plymouth Colony arose when recent arrivals objected as a matter of conscience to
having to work on Christmas day:
On the day called Christmas Day, the Governor called them out to work as was
used. But the most of this new company excused themselves and said it went
against the consciences to work on that day. So the Governor told them that if they
made it a matter of conscience, he would spare them until they were better
informed; so he led away the rest and left them. But when they came home at noon
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conscience-based exception was adopted in Rhode Island.121
The second part examines whether religious groups, in light of cases
such as CLS, particularly on college and university campuses, can be
allowed to preserve their organizational autonomy by establishing their own
membership rules in public institutions if they purportedly violate policies
concerning such sensitive topics such as recognizing same-sex unions. The
third part raises questions about individual desires as they conflict with
church teachings and whether, for instance, government officials have, or
should have, the authority to dictate what qualifies as a religious institution
and who qualifies as religious leaders, the issue litigated in Hosanna-Tabor.
A related consideration examines what can be done if private actors follow
their own consciences in terms of providing services such as “health care”
benefits to others if doing so violates their deeply held beliefs.
A. Religious Identity
1. Health Care
The signature piece of legislation in President Obama’s first term in
office, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“ACA”),122 survived
a challenge at the Supreme Court in National Federation of Independent
Business v. Sebelius.123 As a result, as of August 1, 2013, the health care
from their work, he found them in the street at play, openly; some pitching at bar,
and some at stool-ball and such like sports. So he went to them and took away
their implements and told them it was against his conscience, that they should play
and others work. If they made the keeping of it a matter of devotion, let them keep
their houses; but there should be no gaming or reveling in the streets. Since which
time nothing hath been attempted that way, at least openly.
WILLIAM BRADFORD, OF PLYMOUTH PLANTATION 1620-1647 at 97 (Samuel Eliot Morison, a new
edition, Alfred A. Knof 1952).
121
According to the Charter of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations (1663):
[We] do[e] hereby publish, gra[u]nt, ord[ai]n[e] and declare, [t]hat our royal[l] will
and pleasure is, that no[] person within the sa[i]d colony[], at any t[i]me hereafter
shall be[] any wise molested, punished, disquieted, or called in question, for any
differences in opinion[] in matters of religion, and do[] not actually disturb the
civil[] peace of our sa[i]d colony; but that all and every[] person and persons may,
from t[i]me to t[i]me, and at all t[i]mes hereafter, freely[] and fully[] have and
enjoy[] his and their[] own[] judgments and consciences, in matters of religious
concernments, throughout the tract of land[] hereafter mentioned, they behaving
themselves peaceabl[y] and quietl[y], and not us[e]ing this libert[y] to
l[i]centiousness[] and profaneness[], nor to the civil[] injury[] or outward
disturb[]ance of others, any law[], statute, or clause therein conta[i]ned, or to be[]
conta[i]ned, usage or custom[] of this realm[], to the contrary hereof, in any wise
notwithstanding.
CHARTER OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS (1663), reprinted in THE FEDERAL AND
STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES
TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES NOW OR HERETOFORE FORMING THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, VOL.
VI, 3212–13 (Francis Newton Thorpe ed., 1906, Scholarly Press 1909).
122
Patient Protection and Affordable care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).
123
Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. V. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2600 (2012). For an early commentary
on this case, see Timothy P. O’Neill, Harlan on My Mind: Chief Justice Roberts and the Affordable
Health Care Act, 3 CAL. L. REV. CIR. 170 (2012).
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regulations124 promulgated pursuant to the ACA obligate religious
employers to provide reproductive-health or preventive services.125
It is certainly difficult to disagree with the well-intended broad, if
not utopian, purpose behind the ACA126 to provide affordable health care to
all individuals. Still, reducing costs may be a dubious proposition at best.
President Obama’s assertion in the 2013 State of the Union Address claims
that the ACA will reduce health care costs127 notwithstanding a recent
contrary report issued by the nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office, a
discrepancy unreported on by the media.128
Turning specifically to the ACA’s contraceptive mandates,
supporters, such as Secretary Sebelius of the United States Department of
Health and Human Services, maintain that what is being required is nothing
new.129 If anything, an explanatory preface contends that the application of
the ACA is “consistent with the laws in a majority of states which already
require contraception coverage in health plans, and includes the exemption
in the interim final rule allowing certain religious organizations not to
124
Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of Preventive Services
Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 8725, 8725 (Feb. 15, 2012) (to be
codified at 26 CFR §54; adopting the prior interim rule, 76 Fed. Reg. 46,621, 46,621 (Aug. 3, 2011)).
125
For the official news release at which these interim final rules were made public, see Press
Release, U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Servs., A Statement by U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services Secretary Kathleen Sebelius (Jan. 20, 2012), available at www.hhs.gov/news/press/2012pres/
01/20120120a.html.
126
See Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 78 Fed. Reg. 8456,
8456 (Feb. 6, 2013) (discussing of the rationale behind the ACA).
127
Pres. Barack Obama, 2013 State of the Union Address (Feb. 13, 2013) in N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12,
2013 (“Already, the Affordable Care Act is helping to slow the growth of health care costs.”). Contra
Mark Trumbull, State of the Union 101: Has Obamacare Really Slowed Rise of Health Costs? The
President's State of the Union Claim That Obamacare has Slowed the Rise of Health Costs Misses the
Fact that Key Provisions Don't Kick in Until 2014 and That Slower Spending is Related to a Weak
Economy, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Feb. 13, 2013.
128
This report indicates that health costs continue to rise rather than decrease in the wake of the
enactment of the ACA as the growth in this form of discretionary federal spending exceeds all other
governmental expenditures. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK:
FISCAL YEARS 2013 TO 2023 1 (Feb. 2013), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/
cbofiles/attachments/43907-BudgetOutlook.pdf; see also CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, CBO’S
FEBRUARY 2013 ESTIMATE OF THE EFFECTS OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT ON HEALTH INSURANCE
COVERAGE (Feb. 2013), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/43900_
ACAInsuranceCoverageEffects.pdf. For a discussion of cost issues under the ACA, see Merrill
Matthews & Mark E. Litow, ObamaCare's Health-Insurance Sticker Shock: Thanks to Mandates That
Take Effect in 2014, Premiums in Individual Markets Will Shoot up. Some may Double., WALL ST. J.
ONLINE (Jan. 13, 2013), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014241278873239368045782278909681
00984.html. Matthews and Litow explained the reason for increased health costs:
Health-insurance premiums have been rising—and consumers will experience
another series of price shocks later this year when some see their premiums
skyrocket thanks to the Affordable Care Act, aka ObamaCare. The reason: The
congressional Democrats who crafted the legislation ignored virtually every
actuarial principle governing rational insurance pricing. Premiums will soon
reflect that disregard—indeed, premiums are already reflecting it.
Id.
129
Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Servs., A Statement by U.S. Department of Health
and Human Services Secretary Kathleen Sebelius (Jan. 20, 2012), available at www.hhs.gov/news/press/
2012pres/01/20120120a.html.
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provide contraception coverage.”130 This rhetoric aside, it is inexplicable
why the revised regulations are so tone deaf when it comes to matters of
religious freedom, particularly in light of the history of the conscience
exemption.
The authors of the health care regulations ignored a lengthy history
of respect for, and federal deference to, religious freedom as reflected in
Hosanna-Tabor and other litigation at the Supreme Court.131 Amid
considerable controversy, on February 1, 2013, the Obama Administration
purportedly made changes to the original narrow definitions in the ACA and
its accompanying regulations 132 which granted conscience exemptions,133
referred to as safe harbors,134 only to houses of worship and monastic
communities.135
Officials at religiously affiliated educational institutions, hospitals,
charities, and private employers, are denied conscience exceptions even
under the revised regulations.136 As a result, most religious employers must
130

Id.
See Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 506–07 (1979)
(refusing to extend the authority of the National Labor Relations Board to a dispute over collective
bargaining in a Roman Catholic high school); Corp. of Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 335–36 (1987) (recognizing the right of religious employers to
select who is most qualified to work in their institutions and help to advance their missions).
132
See Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 78 Fed. Reg. 8456,
8456 (Feb. 6, 2013) (discussing the rationale behind the ACA).
133
See generally DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., GUIDANCE ON THE TEMPORARY
ENFORCEMENT SAFE HARBOR FOR CERTAIN EMPLOYERS, GROUP HEALTH PLANS AND GROUP HEALTH
INSURANCE ISSUERS WITH RESPECT TO THE REQUIREMENT TO COVER CONTRACEPTIVE SERVICES
WITHOUT COST SHARING UNDER SECTION 2713 OF THE PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE ACT, SECTION
715(A)(1) OF THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT, AND SECTION 9815(A)(1) OF THE
INTERNAL REVENUE CODE (Aug. 15, 2012), available at http://cciio.cms.gov/resources/files/prevservices-guidance-08152012.pdf (detailing the safe harbor conscience exception). Note 1 of the
Guidance states that, “[t]his bulletin was originally issued on February 10, 2012, to describe the
temporary enforcement safe harbor. In reissuing this bulletin, CMS is not changing the February 10
policy; it is only clarifying three points” relating to these exceptions as applied to non-profit
organizations. Id.
134
In an ad hoc case, the government and a pro-life organization of Roman Catholic priests
stipulated that the latter is entitled to a safe harbor. Stipulation of the Parties at ¶¶ 3–4, Priests for Life v.
Sebelius, No. 1:12-cv-00753-FB-RER (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 2012), available at http://www.american
freedomlawcenter.org/uploads/caseapps/de8a250dc76dd16941a32d184af0b75ae55fcb15.pdf.
135
According to the original regulation, “religious employers” were exempt from the contraceptive
coverage mandate if they meet all of the following characteristics:
(1) The inculcation of religious values is the purpose of the organization.
(2) The organization primarily employs persons who share the religious tenets of
the organization.
(3) The organization serves primarily persons who share the religious tenets of the
organization.
(4) The organization is a nonprofit organization as described in section 6033(a)(1)
and section 6033(a)(3)(A)(i) or (iii) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as
amended.
45 C.F.R. § 147.130(a)(1)(iv)(B).
136
See e.g., proposed 45 C.F.R. § 147.131:
Exemption and accommodations in connection with coverage of preventive health
services.
(a) Religious employers. In issuing guidelines under §147.130(a)(1)(iv), the Health
Resources and Services Administration may establish an exemption from such
131
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provide female employees with preventive care and screenings for
sterilizations137 in addition to the use of abortion-inducing drugs known as
abortifacients—drugs that are not contraceptive in nature as they cause postconception abortions—as well as contraceptives along with “counseling”
(that critics fear may promote these practices)138 without imposing any costsharing requirements on plan beneficiaries.139
Supporters of religious freedom who are critical of the health care
mandates, most notably the United States Conference of Catholic
Bishops,140 view the proposed new regulations141 as little more than a

guidelines with respect to a group health plan established or maintained by a
religious employer . . . with respect to any requirement to cover contraceptive
services under such guidelines. For purposes of this paragraph (a), a “religious
employer” is an organization that is organized and operates as a nonprofit entity
and is referred to in section 6033(a)(3)(A)(i) or (a)(3)(A)(iii) of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986, as amended.
(b) Eligible organizations. An eligible organization is an organization that satisfies
all of the following requirements:
(1) The organization opposes providing coverage for some or all of any
contraceptive services required to be covered under §147.130(a)(1)(iv) on
account of religious objections.
(2) The organization is organized and operates as a nonprofit entity.
(3) The organization holds itself out as a religious organization.
(4) The organization maintains in its records a self-certification, made in
the manner and form specified by the Secretary of Health and Human
Services, for each plan year to which the accommodation is to apply,
executed by a person authorized to make the certification on behalf of the
organization, indicating that the organization satisfies the criteria in
paragraphs (b)(1) through (3) of this section, and, specifying those
contraceptive services for which the organization will not establish,
maintain, administer, or fund coverage, and makes such certification
available for examination upon request.
Health Insurance Reform Requirements for the Group and Individual Health Insurance Markets, 78 Fed.
Reg. 8474, 8474–75 (proposed Feb. 6, 2013) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 147.131). In his response to
the Administration’s new definition of an exempt “religious employer,” Archbishop Lori argues that the
briefer description “maintains the same unacceptable division between places of worship, and religious
organizations that focus on putting faith into action by serving the needy.” Letter from Archbishop
William E. Lori, Chairman, USCCB Ad Hoc Comm. for Religious Liberty to 112th Cong. (Feb. 15,
2013), available at www.usccb.org/issues-and-action/religious-liberty/conscience-protection/upload/
Letter-from-Archbishop-Lori-to-Congress.pdf).
137
See Grace-Marie Turner, No End To ObamaCare's Hostility Toward Religion: Despite Some
Changes, Obamacare Still Violates Religious Rights, INVESTORS BUS. DAILY, Feb. 12, 2013 at A13
(“[T]he cost of sterilization surgery can be $8,000 or more.”).
138
See Women's Preventive Services Guidelines: Affordable Care Act Expands Prevention Coverage
for Women’s Health and Well-Being, HEALTH RES. AND SERVS. ADMIN., http://www.hrsa.gov/
womensguidelines (last visited Sept. 30, 2013); see also Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under
the Affordable Care Act, 78 Fed. Reg. 8456-01, 8458 (Feb. 6, 2013).
139
42 U.S.C. § 300gg–13(a)(4) (Supp. V 2011).
140
HHS Proposal Falls Short in Meeting Church Concerns; Bishops Look Forward to Addressing
Issues with Administration (Feb. 7. 2013), UNITED STATES CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, http://
www.usccb.org/news/2013/13-037.cfm. On February 15, 2013, Most Reverend William E. Lori,
Archbishop of Baltimore Chairman of the Bishops’ Ad Hoc Committee for Religious Liberty, sent a
letter to Congress urging members to enact conscience protections to safeguard creeping encroachments
against freedom of religion, especially as exemplified in the health care mandate. Letter from Archbishop
William E. Lori, Chairman, USCCB Ad Hoc Comm. for Religious Liberty to 112th Cong. (Feb. 15,
2013), available at www.usccb.org/issues-and-action/religious-liberty/conscience-protection/upload/
Letter-from-Archbishop-Lori-to-Congress.pdf. Otherwise, he wrote of his “fear that the federal
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rewording of the original language, putting “old wine into new skins,”142 to
use a Biblical metaphor. These opponents of the ACA concede that, while
the revised regulations would expand the exemption mostly to cover
religious organization that are closely affiliated with single religious
congregations, they do little to safeguard Catholic and other religiously
affiliated universities, schools, hospitals, and charitable organizations, not to
mention that they leave the conscience rights of individual employers
unprotected.143
Concomitantly, officials such as Secretary Sebelius who are
responsible for the recent tweaking of the regulations believe that “[i]ssuers
generally would find that providing such contraceptive coverage is cost
neutral because they would be insuring the same set of individuals under
both policies and would experience lower costs from improvements in
women’s health and fewer childbirths,” by requiring insurance companies to
provide the benefits without receiving premiums or co-payments from
patients.144 Still, what the regulations apparently refuse to recognize is that
insofar as insurance companies will have no option other than passing such
costs along in premiums, religious institutions still run the risk of being
forced to violate their values by having to pay for such objectionable costs
while private employers are not even in the equation.
Proponents of the health care mandate root their position in part in
an argument originating largely in Griswold v. Connecticut, wherein the
Supreme Court struck down a state law forbidding the sale of contraceptives
on the basis that it violated the marital right to privacy.145 According to the
Court, “the First Amendment has a penumbra where privacy is protected
from governmental intrusion.”146 The Court then applied the same
penumbra in a previously undiscovered constitutional right to abortion in
Roe v. Wade.147 These mandate supporters, including, most notably,
President Obama and Secretary Sebelius, herself putatively a Roman
Catholic, are apparently of the opinion that the right to what is
government’s respect for believers and people of conscience no longer measures up to the treatment
Americans have a right to expect from their elected representatives.” Id.
141
Interim Final Rules for Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Internal
Claims and Appeals and External Review Processes Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 43,330 (July 23, 2010) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. Pt. 2590).
142
See Matthew 9:17 (“Neither is new wine put into old wineskins”); Mark 2:22 (“And no one puts
new wine into old wineskins”); and Luke 5:37–39 (“And no one puts new wine into old wineskins;
otherwise the new wine the new wine will burst the skins and will be spilled, and the skins will be
destroyed. But new wine must be put into fresh wineskins. And no one after drinking old wine desires
new wine, but says, ‘The old is good.’”).
143
See Turner, supra note 137.
144
Women’s Preventive Services Coverage and Religious Organizations, CTR. FOR CONSUMER
INFO. AND INS. OVERSIGHT, http://cciio.cms.gov/resources/factsheets/womens-preven-02012013 (last
visited Jan. 14, 2014).
145
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965).
146
Id. at 483.
147
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152–53 (1973).
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euphemistically referred to as “reproductive services” trumps religious
freedom, the history of accommodation for people of faith in the United
States notwithstanding.
The position of the supporters of the mandate is ultimately
untenable because it fails to account for the deep tradition of religious
freedom that is embedded in the fabric of American society and values. As
eloquently stated by Cardinal Timothy Dolan of New York, the federal
health care law mandate offers:
[S]econd-class status to our first-class institutions in
Catholic health care, Catholic education and Catholic
charities. The Department of Health and Human Services
offers what it calls an 'accommodation,' rather than
accepting the fact that these ministries are integral to our
church and worthy of the same exemption as our Catholic
churches.148
Archbishop Charles Chaput of Philadelphia added that “[t]he White
House has made no concessions to the religious conscience claims of private
businesses, and the whole spirit of the 'compromise' is minimalist."149
The upshot of the health care reform mandate, and conceding that
judicial developments are moving rapidly, is that employers, regardless of
whether they are religious or operated by secular individuals of faith, face an
existential threat to the free exercise of religion, leaving them with
essentially three equally unpalatable options. First, employers who believe
that having to pay for birth control medications, abortifacients, and
counseling about abortion are immoral, face the prospect of being asked to
cooperate with the grave evils associated with the birth control dimensions
of the ACA by having to violate their deeply held religious beliefs and
consciences150 by having to fund these items for their employees.151 Second,
employers can face the crushing financial obligations in the form of punitive
measures including fines of $100.00 per day per employee152 and annual tax
assessments for noncompliance with the requirement of providing health
insurance to employees,153 actions which may ultimately lead to their
148

Robert Pear, Bishops Reject Birth Control Compromise, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2013 at A14.
Id.
For a state case concerning a conscience exception, see Morr-Fitz, Inc. v. Quinn, 976 N.E.2d
1160, 1175–76 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012) (holding that pharmacies were not required to exhaust administrative
remedies by seeking a variance and whether pharmacies can be compelled to violate their religious
beliefs is a question of law).
151
Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Servs., A Statement by U.S. Department of Health
and Human Services Secretary Kathleen Sebelius (Jan. 20, 2012), available at www.hhs.gov/news/press/
2012pres/01/20120120a.html.
152
29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (2006) (civil enforcement actions by the Department of Labor and insurance
plan participants); 26 U.S.C. §§ 4980D (b) (2006) (penalty of $100 per day per employee for employers
failing to comply with the coverage provisions of the HCA).
153
26 U.S.C. § 4980H (Supp. IV 2010).
149
150
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closures and the discontinuation of the services that they offer. If the federal
government can require these employers to act against their beliefs, then
what is to stop officials from further trammeling American religious
freedom by requiring, for example, Jewish butchers to sell meats that are not
Kosher154 or Muslim shopkeepers to sell food products that are not Halal?
Third, employers can simply discontinue providing health insurance to
employees.155
Not surprisingly, opposition to the health mandate grows. To date,
there are 91 cases and over 300 plaintiffs representing hospitals,
universities, businesses, schools, and people all speaking with one voice to
affirm the freedom of religion guaranteed in the Constitution.156 These suits,
which emerged in both federal and state157 courts, involved not-for-profit
religious institutions158 as well as private individuals.159 Further, private
business owners have succeeded significantly more often than not, having
154
In another question involving religious rituals, a federal trial court in New York, in a lengthy
opinion, rejected the claim that the plan requiring informed parental consent for a form of circumcision
known as oral suction infringed on the religious freedom of an ultra-Orthodox Jewish sect. Cent.
Rabbinical Congr. of the USA & Canada v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene, No. 12 Civ. 7590
(NRB), 2013 WL 126399, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan 10. 2013). The parental consent plan, introduced by the
New York City Department of Health, was designed to prevent the risk of transmission of herpes insofar
as the individuals who performed the circumcisions used their mouths to remove blood from the
incisions. Id. For additional background on this controversy, see Sharon Otterman, Consent Rule May
Proceed for a Circumcision Ritual, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2013, at A20; Sharon Otterman, Board Votes to
Regulate Circumcision, Citing Risks, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2012, at A24 (reporting that two children
who were circumcised via this method contracted, and died from, herpes-related complications while
another two suffered brain damage).
155
See, e.g., Rich Kirchen, Survey: More Milwaukee-area Small biz see Dropping Health Plans With
Reform, BUS. J. MILWAUKEE, Nov. 1, 2012, available at 2012 WLNR 23351249 (“Approximately one in
four Milwaukee-area employers with between 20 and 99 employees say they are either ‘likely’ or ‘very
likely’ to drop their company's health plan in 2014 and let employees purchase individual insurance
through new health-benefits exchanges . . . .).
156
HHS Mandate Information Central, BECKET FUND, http://www.becketfund.org/hhsinformation
central/ (last visited Nov. 5, 2013) (Adding that thus far 46 for-profit lawsuits have been filed over the
HHS mandate. 33 have secured injunctive relief against the mandate, only six have been denied relief,
one dismissed on procedural grounds, and one case is pending review. Of the 39 cases with rulings
touching on the merits, the current scorecard is 33-6. 45 non-profit lawsuits have been filed against
Secretary Sebelius over the HHS mandate. This includes lawsuits by religious organizations such as
hospitals, charities, religious colleges, and Catholic dioceses. To date, 19 injunctions have been granted,
and only 1 denied).
157
See Mo. Ins. Coalition v. Huff, No. 4:12CV02354AGF, 2012 WL 6681688 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 21,
2012) (granting a temporary restraining order enjoining a state law requiring insurance companies to
offer and issue policies excluding coverage for contraceptives where such coverage is contrary to the
moral, ethical, or religious beliefs or tenets of the persons or entities seeking insurance on the basis that it
was pre-empted by the federal health care mandates).
158
For a case granting limited relief to a religious institution, see Wheaton College v. Sebelius, 703
F.3d 551, 553 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (holding an appeal in abeyance pending further action by the
administration). Although not named in this order, the case was joined by officials at a Catholic College
in North Carolina, Belmont Abbey College v. Sebelius, 1:12-cv-01169-ESH (D.C. Cir. Sept. 20, 2012),
http://www.becketfund.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/Scan0052.jpg (granting a motion for expedited
consideration). For a case refusing to dismiss a challenge to the ACA based on the grounds of ripeness
and standing, see Roman Catholic Diocese of Forth Worth v. Sebelius, CA No. 4:12-CV-314-Y (N.D.
Tex. Jan. 31, 2013), http://c0391070.cdn2.cloudfiles.rackspacecloud.com/pdf/order-denying-motiondismiss-roman-catholic-diocese-forth-worth-v-hhs.pdf.
159
See Kinder v. Geithner, 695 F.3d 772, 778 (8th Cir. 2012) (rejecting a challenge to the Act filed
by private individuals).
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prevailed, at least temporarily, in most,160 but not all, of the fourteen161 cases
in which they sought injunctions alleging that compliance with the health
care mandate violated their rights to the free exercise of religion under the
First Amendment and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA).162
Under the RFRA, the United States “[g]overnment may
substantially burden a person's exercise of religion only if it demonstrates
that application of the burden to the person—(1) is in furtherance of a
compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of
furthering that compelling governmental interest.”163 In light of this
statutory language, it is difficult to imagine that the regulations can survive
judicial scrutiny based on how they have an impact on the free exercise of
religion. To the extent that the impact of the ACA is hardly the least
restrictive means possible for ensuring that birth control pills, for example,
be made available to all women despite their minimal cost,164 this is more a
battle over whether the government can impose its will over religious
organizations and employers of faith than it is about health care. If
Hosanna-Tabor is to serve as any kind of precedent, albeit in a different
160
For cases granting injunctions to private employers, see Korte v. Sebelius, No. 12 3841, 2012 WL
6757353, at *5 (7th Cir. 2012); Grote v. Sebelius, No. 13 1077, 2013 WL 362725, at *4 (7th Cir. 2013);
O'Brien v. United States Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., No. 12-3357, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 26633,
at *4 (8th Cir. Nov. 28, 2012) (granting a stay pending an appeal); Annex Med., Inc. v. Sebelius, No. 131118, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 2497, at *10 (8th Cir. Feb. 1, 2013); Triune Health Group v. United States
Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 12 C 6756 (N.D. Ill. 2013) http://www.becketfund.org/wpcontent/uploads/2012/05/Triune-DCT-Doc-49-Order-Granting-Prelim-Injunction-1-3-13.pdf; American
Pulverizer Co. v. United States Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., No. 12-3459-CV-S-RED, 2012 WL
6951316, at *5 (W.D. Mo. 2012); Legatus v. Sebelius, No. 12 12061, 2012 WL 5359630, at *15 (E.D.
Mich. 2012); Newland v. Sebelius, 881 F. Supp. 2d. 1287, 1299 (D. Colo. 2012); Monaghan v. Sebelius,
No. 12 15488, 2012 WL 6738476, at *8 (E.D. Mich. 2012); Sharpe Holdings, Inc. v. United States Dep’t
of Health and Human Servs., No. 2:12-CV-92-DDN, 2012 WL 6738489, at *7 (N.D. Mo. 2012). For a
case involving a not-for-profit religious publisher, see Tyndale House Publishers, Inc. v. Sebelius, No. 12
1635(RBW), 2012 WL 5817323, at *20 (D.D.C. 2012); see also supra note 156.
161
See Conestoga Wood Specialities Corp. v. Sebelius, No. 12 6744, 2013 WL 140110, at *18 (E.D.
Pa. 2013) (refusing to grant injunction to private for-profit employer); Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v.
Sebelius, 870 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1293–96 (W.D. Okla. 2012) (rejecting the change that the mandate
imposes a substantial burden on the firm’s exercise of religion even though non-compliance subjects
employers to massive financial penalties), appeal denied, No. 12-6294, 2012 WL 6930302 (10th Cir.
Dec. 20, 2012) (rejecting the charge that the mandate imposes a substantial burden on the firm’s exercise
of religion even though non-compliance subjects employers to massive financial penalties), appeal
denied,133 S. Ct. 641 (2012); Autocam Corp. v. Sebelius, No. 12-2673, at 3 (6th Cir. Dec. 28, 2012),
available at http://www.becketfund.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/order-denying-injunctionAutocamCA6.pdf (denying the motion for an injunction pending appeal). A petition for certiorari was, however,
recently filed in the United States Supreme Court, seeking review of the Sixth Circuit’s decision in
Autocam Corp. See Howard Friedman, Cert. Filed in Contraceptive Mandate Case, RELIGION CLAUSE
(Oct. 15, 2013, 12:46 PM), http://religionclause.blogspot.com/2013/10/cert-filed-in-contraceptivemandate-case.html.
162
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–2000cc-4 (2006).
163
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b).
164
See, e.g., Turner, supra note 137 (“Proponents of the mandate argued that birth control pills can
cost several thousand dollars a year (even though a one-month prescription can be filled for $9 at
Walmart).”); Mark Zimmerman, Catholic Leaders say Lawsuit Aims to Protect Religious Freedom,
CATH. STANDARD, May 22, 2012, available at 2012 WLNR 10837017 (“noting that with a prescription,
birth control pills are readily available at major retailers for $9 a month, and at no cost from various
health care clinics.”).
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factual context, the Court emphatically rejected the EEOC’s attempt to
impose its will on religious institutions.
In light of the unsuccessful challenge to the constitutionality of the
entire ACA, the outcome of the suits disputing the health care regulations
remains to be seen. Moreover, as the initial round of litigation is
progressing, the battle over religious freedom is intensifying. In the first
case to date to reach the Court, Hobby Lobby Stores v. Sebelius, on an
interlocutory appeal from the Tenth Circuit, Justice Sotomayor, a President
Obama appointee, refused to enjoin the enforcement of the regulations
promulgated pursuant to the health care mandate.165 The suit was filed by a
for-profit employer with Christian ownership alleging that its sincerely-held
religious beliefs, pursuant to the First Amendment and the RFRA, were
violated by having to provide insurance coverage for specified drugs and
devices designed to cause post-conception abortions.166
On further review, though, the Tenth Circuit reversed in favor of
Hobby Lobby.167 In recognizing that the corporation was a “person” within
the meaning of the RFRA and that it had protected rights under the Free
Exercise Clause, the court was satisfied that its legal team demonstrated the
substantial likelihood of success on the merits of it claims that the mandate
violated its rights under the RFRA by placing a substantial burden on its
right to exercise religious freedom. The federal government quickly filed a
certiorari petition which the Supreme Court accepted, challenging the
outcome in Hobby Lobby.168
In Hobby Lobby the Tenth Circuit thus joined the District of
Columbia169 and the Seventh Circuit170 to the contrary in granting orders to
enjoin enforcement of the law. On the other hand, the Third171 and Sixth172
Circuits refused to enjoin the enforcement of the mandate. Given this split
among federal appellate courts, this dispute is headed to a showdown at the
Supreme Court, which will either confirm the centrality of religious freedom
165

Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 133 S. Ct. 641, 643 (2012).
Id. at 642.
167
Hobby Lobby Stores v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1121–22 (10th Cir. 2013), remanded to 2013
WL 3869832 (W.D. Okla. 2013), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 678.
168
Id.
169
Gilardi v. United States Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 733 F.3d 1208, 1224 (allowing the
claims of the owners of a for-profit small business who were Catholic to proceed on the ground that they
were likely to succeed on the merits of their RFRA claim to the ACA’s contraceptive coverage mandate,
but rejecting the allegations of the business corporations). The corporations quickly filed a petition for
certiorari. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 1, Gilardi v. United States Dep’t. of Health and Human Servs.,
No. 13-567, http://media.aclj.org/pdf/gilardi-petition-for-certiorari-filed.pdf; see also Wheaton College v.
Sebelius, 703 F.3d 551, 553 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
170
See Korte v. Sebelius, No. 12 3841, 2012 WL 6757353, at *1 (7th Cir. Dec. 28, 2012) (granting a
preliminary injunction two small for-profit businesses and their owners, finding that the organizations
were persons qualified to raise the claims that the ACA violated their right to religious freedom).
171
Conestoga Wood Specialities Corp. v. Sec. of United States Dept. of Health and Human Servs.
724 F.3d 377, 389 (3rd Cir. 2013).
172
Eden Foods, Inc. v. Sebelius, 733 F.3d 626, 633, (6th Cir. 2013).
166
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and conscience rights in the United States or relegate believers to the
margins, ignoring more than two hundred years of history.
The impact of the dispute involving Hobby Lobby, a retail store, on
religious freedom, not to mention general respect for the law as the plaintiffs
act the auspices of civil disobedience, may turn out to be all the more
significant since the owners have engaged in what can be described as a
game of high stakes poker. Put another way, Hobby Lobby owners upped
the ante considerably when an attorney representing the company and a
related corporation announced almost immediately that organizational
officials would not comply with the health mandate, thereby risking paying
up to $1.3 million per day as of January 1, 2013,173 a fine that has yet to
materialize.
On one side of the battle brewing over religious freedom, the
members of the American Catholic hierarchy, as a vanguard of faith-based
organizations, are attempting to counter policies they believe to be harmful
to religious liberty, however broadly this notion is defined.174 The Bishops
fear that the federal mandates threaten the missions and identities175 of a
multitude of faith-based institutions, especially those that are Roman
Catholic, such as hospitals176 and schools,177 which offer great benefit for the
common good. From the perspective of the Catholic Church, these disputes
are arising at the very moment that the American judiciary appears to have
fallen prey to the “dictatorship of relativism” of which Pope Benedict XVI
warned.178
The other side of the battle over this issue can be described as the
173
Don Mecoy, Retailer is Suing to Block Federal Health Care law Provision on Contraception
Coverage, THE DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Dec. 28, 2012, at 1A.
174
Bishops Urge Catholics to Pray for Life, Marriage, Religious Liberty, U.S CONF. OF CATH.
BISHOPS (Dec. 6, 2012), http://www.usccb.org/news/2012/12-212.cfm (last visited Jan. 14, 2014).
175
This issue remains in the forefront for Catholic institutions in particular. See Libby A. Nelson,
Catholic Colleges Consider Role of Trustees, INSIDE HIGHER EDUC. (Jan. 30, 2012, 3:00AM), http://
www.insidehighered.com/news/2012/01/30/catholic-colleges-consider-role-trustees (reporting on the
January 29, 2012, comments of Rev. Joseph P. McFadden, Bishop of Harrisburg, Pa., chair of the United
States Conference of Catholic Bishops’ Committee on Catholic Education, that ‘‘It’s time for the laity [as
members of boards of trustees] to step up to ensure that the Catholic faith continues into the third
millennium[.]’’).
176
See Catholic Health Care and Social Services, U.S CONF. OF CATH. BISHOPS (2012), http://www.
usccb.org/about/media-relations/statistics/health-care-social-service.cfm (“629 Catholic hospitals account
for 12.6% of community hospitals in the United States; 88,519,295 patients are assisted annually[;] [o]ne
in six patients in the U.S. is cared for in a Catholic hospital[;] [t]here were nearly 19 million emergency
room visits and more than 100 million outpatient visits in Catholic hospitals during a one-year period[;]
[and] [m]ore than 5.5 million patients are admitted to Catholic hospitals annually . . . .”).
177
According to the most recent data available from the Private School Universe Survey, 1,718,351
of the 4,700,119 children who attend non-public schools in the United States are enrolled in catholic
elementary and secondary schools. Private School Universe Survey, NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATION
STATISTICS, http://nces.ed.gov/surveys/pss/tables/table_2009_14.asp (last visited Jan. 14, 2014).
178
Adelle M. Banks, Evangelicals Hear Their Moral Language, SUN HERALD, April 4, 2005, at B1,
available at 2005 WLNR 22885649 (reporting that “[t]he day before Roman Catholic Cardinal Joseph
Ratzinger became Pope Benedict XVI, he declared in a public Mass that a ‘dictatorship of relativism’
threatens the absolute truth claims of the church.”).
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disingenuousness on the part of opponents of the Catholic Church. These
media critics, who long failed to report that suits had been filed, arguably
mischaracterized litigation challenging the mandate by alleging that “[t]he
real threat to religious liberty comes from the effort to impose one church's
doctrine on everyone.”179 Yet, the health care mandate is little more than the
next skirmish in a continuing battle royale about whether sincerely and long
held Judeo-Christian values are to be permitted to remain in the mainstream
or whether they will be pushed to the periphery, only to be replaced by the
relativistic goals of activist groups.
As evidence of the intensity that the battle over religious freedom
may take on, at least one opponent filed suit against the Catholic Church, in
particular,180 in an attempt to deny it aid because of its pro-life positions
with regard to abortion.181 Still, other opponents have sought to have the
Catholic Church classified as a hate group in light of its stance with regard
to homosexuality.182 The threat of governmental over-reaching through
such statutes and regulations with the potential to force many faith-based
services out of existence runs the risk of standing the constitutional
guarantees of religious freedom, long-developed by the American judiciary,
on their proverbial ears.
2. Same-Sex Unions
A second category of emerging threats to religious identity are
surfacing as proponents of same-sex unions,183 some of whom are
179
Editorial, The Politics of Religion, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2012 at A16, available at 2012 WLNR
11193583.
180
The Catholic Church is by no means alone in being singled out for criticism for its beliefs. For
instance, the Southern Poverty Law Center has apparently demonstrated broadly anti-Christian attitudes
without regard to particular denominations within Christianity in light of its difference of opinion with
regard to a variety of issues. See Matt Barber, Bloody Hands: The Southern Poverty Law Center,
TOWNHALL.COM (Feb. 11, 2013), http://townhall.com/columnists/mattbarber/2013/02/11/bloody-handsthe-southern-poverty-law-center-n1509321/page/full/ (“‘The Southern Poverty Law Center has a long
history of maliciously slandering pro-family groups with language and labels that incite hatred and
undermine civil discourse,’ said Mat Staver, founder and chairman of Liberty Counsel.”); see also Katie
Yoder, Networks Ignore FRC Shooter’s Use of SPLC ‘Hate Map’, MEDIA RESEARCH CENTER (Feb. 7,
2013, 3:47 PM), http://www.mrc.org/articles/networks-ignore-frc-shooters-use-splc-hate-map (detailing
how the mainstream media failed to report that the map a man used to locate the headquarters of the
Family Research Center in Washington, D.C., where he shot and injured a guard, was created at the
SPLC; the map also identified the locations of the offices of groups with which the SPLC disagreed);
Charlotte Allen, King of Fearmongers: Morris Dees and the Southern Poverty Law Center, Scaring
Donors Since 1971, THE WEEKLY STANDARD, April 15, 2013, 18–25.
181
In re United States Catholic Conference, 885 F.2d 1020, 1031 (2d Cir. 1989); Abortion Rights
Mobilization, Inc. v. United States Catholic Conference, 495 U.S. 918 (1990) (affirming that a proabortion group lacked standing to challenge the tax exempt status of the Roman Catholic Church based
on its pro-life teachings).
182
See An Assault on Freedom of Religion: Discrimination is Wrong, Even Against Traditional
Christian Beliefs, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2013 at B02; see also Michelle Bauman, White House
Petitioned to Label Catholic Church a ‘Hate Group’, CATHOLIC NEWS AGENCY (Jan. 4, 2013), http://
www.catholicnewsagency.com/news/white-house-petitioned-to-label-catholic-church-a-hate-group/.
183
For representative commentary in support of same sex unions from a faith-based perspective,
see, e.g., Jeremiah H. Russell, The Religious Liberty Argument for Same-Sex Marriage and its Effects
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vociferous,184 and call for greater public recognition of and accommodation
for homosexuality.185 Since the Supreme Court has invalidated the Federal
Defense of Marriage Act186 and California’s Proposition 8,187 the
protestations of some of its supporters to the contrary notwithstanding, the
impact of these decisions may have far-reaching consequences for religious
and secular organizations. To this end, it is conceivable that religious
organizations, specifically, run the risk of having their rights trammeled if
they are required to recognize and accommodate these relationships despite
their deeply and long-held beliefs that this lifestyle is inconsistent with their
teachings.188

Upon Legal Recognition, 7 RUTGERS J.L. & RELIGION 4 (2005); Richard D. Mohr, The Case for Gay
Marriage, 9 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 215 (1995).
184
While conceding that protesters such as these undoubtedly represent a small fringe minority, an
egregious example of antipathy for Christian, specifically Roman Catholic, beliefs and sensitivities,
occurred on December 10, 1989. Mike Dorning, Religion, Gays, Politics Turn Parade Into Battle, CHI.
TRIB. 1 (Mar. 15, 1993), available at 1993 WLNR 4062014. Members of the AIDS-awareness group
ACT-UP chained themselves to pews in St. Patrick’s Cathedral and shouted down Cardinal O'Connor at
a Sunday Mass before others “received” the Eucharist but spat it out on to the ground, desecrating the
Sacrament by stepping on the consecrated hosts. Id. One can only wonder what kind of outrage this
behavior might have stirred had it occurred in a house of worship of some other faith.
185
For commentary on how same sex unions might impact education, see Charles J. Russo, Respect
for me but not for Thee: Reflections on the Impact of Same-Sex Marriage on Education, 2011 BYU
EDUC. & L.J. 471 (2011); Richard S. Myers, Same-Sex Marriage, Education, and Parental Rights, 2011
BYU EDUC. & L.J. 303 (2011).
186
See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693–96 (2013) (finding the Act unconstitutional
as a deprivation of the liberty of the person protected by the Fifth Amendment by defining marriage as a
union of one man and one woman as husband and wife and that it operated to deprive same-sex couples
of the benefits and responsibilities that come with the federal recognition of their marriages, thereby
placing a stigma on all who have entered into same-sex unions).
187
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2667–68 (2013) (striking down the voter-enacted state
constitutional amendment defining a valid marriage as one between a man and a woman on the ground
that its proponents lacked standing to sue), on remand, 725 F.3d 1140 (9th Cir. 2013) (dismissing the
claim for lack of jurisdiction).
188
This article, which focuses more on the impact of same sex relationships than its legal status,
adopts the position consistent with the teachings of the Roman Catholic and other mainline Christian
Churches through the centuries in accepting the Augustinian notion of “hat[ing] the sin but lov[ing] the
sinner,” ST, AUGUSTINE, CITY OF GOD 304 (Gerald G. Walsh, Demetrius B. Zema, Grace Monahan,
Daniel Honan, trans., 1958). In other words, while this article recognizes that there is a no distinction
between people as individuals and what they do in the privacy of their own homes, the author refuses to
treat unions between two members of the same sex as being equal to marriage between heterosexual
couples. Although it does not address same sex relationships directly, according to the Catechism of the
Catholic Church (“The Catechism”):
Homosexuality refers to relations between men or between women who
experience an exclusive or predominant sexual attraction toward persons of the
same sex. It has taken a great variety of forms through the centuries and in
different cultures. Its psychological genesis remains largely unexplained. Basing
itself on Sacred Scripture, which presents homosexual acts as acts of grave
depravity, tradition has always declared that ‘homosexual acts are intrinsically
disordered.’ They are contrary to the natural law. They close the sexual act to the
gift of life. They do not proceed from a genuine affective and sexual
complementarity. Under no circumstances can they be approved.”
THE CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH ¶ 2357(2d ed.) (emphasis added, internal citations omitted),
available at http://www.usccb.org/beliefs-and-teachings/what-we-believe/catechism/catechism-of-thecatholic-church/epub/index.cfm.
Although not expressly repudiating same-sex unions, The Catechism makes it clear that marriage
is a union of heterosexuals:
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At best, it is disingenuous to claim that the disputes underlying
some of the litigation discussed herein are about equality and have nothing
to do with values. If anything, disagreements about topics such as same-sex
unions, whether on college campuses, in elementary and secondary schools,
or as they affect the religious freedom of churches and other religious
organizations,189 are every bit as value-laden as seeking to teach about
practicing Christianity in public schools. The third section of this
discussion, on individual desires versus Church teachings, raises additional
questions, hypothetical and real, related to what might occur, and is
happening, on issues such as same-sex unions and whether same-sex
couples may enroll their children in faith-based schools.
As a precursor to the discussion in the next section, it is important to
note that comments made herein are not intended as personal criticism of
supporters of what is referred to as “same-sex marriage.” Rather, since
there seems to be no reason to modify marriage as it has been lived through
the ages as the basis of civil society, from the perspective of the mainline
Judeo-Christian tradition, the author respects those whose ideas differ, but
disagrees with their point of view. Further, consistent with the views of
proponents of same-sex relationships, the author believes that while all
persons are, of course, entitled to full respect and human dignity regardless
of their sexual orientation, it is something altogether different to espouse the
view that relationships between two persons of the same sex should be
accorded the same legal status of marriage, particularly since doing so might
have a significant impact on the status of how churches and other religious
bodies can exercise their rights to religious freedom since such changes may
leave them vulnerable to charges of discrimination.
B. Organizational Autonomy
It is curious that in a society which purportedly values diversity190
Holy Scripture affirms that man and woman were created for one another: ‘It is
not good that the man should be alone.’ The woman, ‘flesh of his flesh,’ his equal,
his nearest in all things, is given to him by God as a ‘helpmate’; she thus
represents God from whom comes our help. ‘Therefore a man leaves his father and
his mother and cleaves to his wife, and they become one flesh.’ The Lord himself
shows that this signifies an unbreakable union of their two lives by recalling what
the plan of the Creator had been ‘in the beginning’: ‘So they are no longer two, but
one flesh.’
Id. at ¶ 1605 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted), available at http://www.usccb.org/beliefsand-teachings/what-we-believe/catechism/catechism-of-the-catholic-church/epub/index.cfm.
189
For an article seeking to bridge the gap in such disputes, see Jennifer Gerarda Brown,
Peacemaking in the Culture War Between Gay Rights and Religious Liberty, 95 IOWA L. REV. 747
(2010).
190
See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003) (declaring that insofar as diversity is a
compelling governmental interest, officials at the University of Michigan Law School could use race as a
factor in admissions decisions pursuant to their race conscious admissions policy since the criteria were
sufficiently narrowly tailored to achieve the compelling state interest of having a racially diverse student
body); for a commentary on this case, see William E. Thro & Charles J. Russo, The Constitutionality of
Racial Preferences in K-12 Education After Grutter and Gratz, 211 EDUC. L. REP. 537 (2006).
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(at least in terms of such personal characteristics as race, gender, ethnicity,
and sexual orientation), many in public life, especially on higher education
campuses, are increasingly intolerant of a diversity of perspectives. Many
of these critics seem unaccepting of views different from their own and that
do not comport with prevailing orthodoxies of the day.
As demonstrated by the Supreme Court’s CLS opinion, it is
increasingly difficult for faith-based groups on campuses, and other
environments seemingly hostile to ideas which differ from the perceived
politically correct norms, to preserve membership rules and values grounded
in their sincerely held religious beliefs as they seek to maintain a place in
the “marketplace of ideas.”191 Unfortunately, this difficulty is true
throughout public education whether in elementary and secondary schools192
or in institutions of higher learning.
Especially in higher education, challenges have arisen in groups that
seek to silence opposition by employing so-called “speech codes,” often
labeling ideas with which they disagree as hate speech.193 These codes can
be seen as a means of censoring others, obligating those with whom the
rule-makers disagree to comply with policies on issues, including the
recognition of same-sex unions, and punishing groups that fail or refuse to
accede to prevailing politically correct cultural norms, denying them
funding and access to campus facilities.194
However, the Court agreed to take up another challenge to the use of race in admissions in Fisher v.
Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 2011), reh’g en banc denied, 644 F.3d 301 (5th Cir.
2011) (upholding the use of race in admissions), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 1536 (2012) (Mem). For a prejudgment commentary on this case, see Philip T.K. Daniel & Scott Greytak, Requiem for Affirmative
Action in Higher Education: Case Analysis Leading to Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, 279
EDUC. L. REP. 539 (2006).
191
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 831–32 (1995). The Court
applied viewpoint neutrality in holding that a policy permitting university officials to authorize payment
for printing the publications of student organizations applied to a Christian journal, since its speech was
protected by the First Amendment:
The dissent's assertion that no viewpoint discrimination occurs because the
Guidelines discriminate against an entire class of viewpoints reflects an
insupportable assumption that all debate is bipolar and that antireligious speech is
the only response to religious speech. Our understanding of the complex and
multifaceted nature of public discourse has not embraced such a contrived
description of the marketplace of ideas. If the topic of debate is, for example,
racism, then exclusion of several views on that problem is just as offensive to the
First Amendment as exclusion of only one. It is as objectionable to exclude both a
theistic and an atheistic perspective on the debate as it is to exclude one, the other,
or yet another political, economic, or social viewpoint. The dissent's declaration
that debate is not skewed so long as multiple voices are silenced is simply wrong;
the debate is skewed in multiple ways.
Id.
192
As noted, Congress enacted the Equal Access act to combat this concern. See supra note 3 for a
discussion of the law and related litigation.
193
See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Unpleasant Speech on Campus, Even Hate Speech, is a First
Amendment Issue, 17 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 765 (2009); David Schimmel, Are “Hate Speech”
Codes Unconstitutional? An Analysis of R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 76 EDUC. L. REP. 653 (1992).
194
See generally FOUNDATION FOR INDIVIDUALS RIGHTS IN EDUCATION, http://thefire.org/ (last
visited Jan. 14, 2014) (this organization is devoted to free speech on college and university campuses).
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Many critics of the Christian worldview, or, for that matter, of any
perspective, apparently fail to recognize that simply remaining silent in the
face of ideas or speech with which they disagree does not necessarily mean
assent. In like manner, proponents of dominant perspectives ought not to be
permitted to preclude others from being allowed to engage in peaceful
expressions195 of their differing points of view.196 In this regard, the
Supreme Court has protected religious speech as a subset of First
Amendment free speech197 along with speech that can be viewed as
offensive.198
In protecting religious and other forms of peaceful speech, the
Supreme Court has recognized that neither individuals nor groups may be
discriminated against because others disagree with what they have to say. If
anything, consistent with Justice Scalia’s dissenting perspective in Lee,199 it
seems fair to ask what better places exist than educational institutions,
whether colleges and universities or elementary and secondary schools, the
very settings purportedly open to the pursuit of knowledge and designed to
allow all sides to have their say openly, freely, and without recrimination.
Of course, issues dealing with group identity and leadership qualifications
present a different issue.
195
Absent a reasonable forecast of material and/or substantial disruption, the fact that opponents
disagree with an organizations views is an insufficient basis on to which restrict groups that may be
unpopular. See, e.g., East High Gay/Straight Alliance v. Bd. of Educ., 81 F. Supp.2d 1166, 1197–98 (D.
Utah 1999); Straights and Gays for Equality v. Osseo Area Schs., 540 F.3d 911, 916 (8th Cir. 2008)
(allowing clubs consisting of students who are straight and gay to meet in public schools during noninstructional hours).
196
Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 637–38 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted),
(disagreeing with “[t]he Court's notion that a student who simply sits in ‘respectful silence’ during the
invocation and benediction (when all others are standing) has somehow joined—or would somehow be
perceived as having joined—in the prayers is nothing short of ludicrous. . . . [S]urely ‘our social
conventions,’ have not coarsened to the point that anyone who does not stand on his chair and shout
obscenities can reasonably be deemed to have assented to everything said in his presence. . . . It is
fanciful enough to say that ‘a reasonable dissenter,’ standing head erect in a class of bowed heads, ‘could
believe that the group exercise signified her own participation or approval of it.’ It is beyond the absurd
to say that she could entertain such a belief while pointedly declining to rise.”).
197
See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 277 (1981) (relying on the framework of freedom of
speech, indicating that insofar as over 100 registered student groups used campus facilities at the
University of Missouri-Kansas City, officials created a forum for the exchange of ideas such that they
could not deny a religious group access to them solely because of the content of the speech of its
members); see also Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 395 (1993)
(applying viewpoint neutrality in ruling that a public school board could not deny a religious group
access to district facilities as long as they were available to other organizations); see also Rosenberger v.
Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 845 (1995); see also Good News Club v. Milford Cent.
Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 120 (2001) (reasoning that a school board violated a religious club's rights to free
speech by engaging in impermissible viewpoint discrimination in refusing to allow it to use school
facilities for its meetings because of their religious content even though other groups could cover the
same issues at their meetings albeit from secular perspectives).
198
See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1213 (2011) (affirming that insofar as the speech of
church members who picketed near the funeral of a soldier who was killed in Iraq based on their desire to
communicate its belief “that God hates and punishes the United States for its tolerance of homosexuality,
particularly in America's military” was of public concern, it was entitled to special protection under the
First Amendment).
199
Lee, 505 U.S. at 631–46 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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A recent example of campus intolerance toward religion surfaced at
Tufts University in a manner reminiscent of CLS, where opponents
attempted to deprive a Christian group of its campus status because
organizational rules require group leaders to adhere to “basic biblical truths
of Christianity” and reject gay lifestyles.200 While university officials
subsequently reversed course and allowed faith-based student groups to
retain the religious requirements for their leaders,201 there is no reason to
believe that similar controversies are unlikely to continue. Only months
earlier, fourteen out of thirty Christian groups at Vanderbilt University left
campus over the same issue,202 prompting members of Congress to ask
officials to exempt faith-based organizations from the institutional “allcomers policy” on the basis that it discriminates against religious beliefs.203
In CLS for that matter, Justice Ginsburg’s204 opinion ignored the fact
that there were more than sixty campus RSOs at Hastings, many of which
“were and are dedicated to expressing a message.”205 Yet, Justice Ginsburg
joined Hastings officials in misrepresenting the position of the Society and
asserted that all campus groups were obligated to accept all comers, “thus
making CLS [the Society] the only student group whose application for
registration has ever been rejected.”206 In refusing to take seriously the
Society’s concerns that individuals who disagreed with its mission might
take control of the organization, Justice Ginsburg summarily dismissed this
fear “as more hypothetical than real”207 since those opposed to the religious
group failed to make such an effort up to the date when the case was
litigated.208 Consequently, in singling out a Christian organization to be
ostracized, Justice Ginsburg and the majority did not even deem it
appropriate to consider the fears of the group that held the minority position
on campus by applying a rule that was not imposed on any other RSO, or
perhaps suggest that opponents were free to form their own organizations in
200
See Katherine Landergan, Group of Evangelicals at Tufts Fights a ‘De-recognizing’ Effort, BOS.
GLOBE, Oct. 27, 2012, available at 2012 WLNR 22802278 (reporting on efforts to de-recognize an
evangelical student group because opponents objected to its religious views).
201
Peter Schworm, Tufts Shifts Course, Grants More Leeway to Student Religious Groups, BOS.
GLOBE, Dec. 7, 2012, available at 2012 WLNR 26033344.
202
Andy Sher, Social Issues Stole the Spotlight This Year in the Tennessee Legislature,
CHATTANOOGA TIMES, May 6, 2012, available at 2012 WLNR 9587648.
203
Elizabeth Bewley, Members of Congress Target Vanderbilt Policy, TENNESSEAN, May 8, 2012,
available at 2012 WLNR 9663350; see also Va. Passes Ban on Campus ‘All-Comers’ Policy, CBN
NEWS (Feb. 26, 2013), http://www.cbn.com/cbnnews/us/2013/February/Va-Passes-Ban-on-Campus-AllComers-Policy/ (noting that the legislature of Virginia enacted a law designed to ban all-comers policies,
allowing campus groups to grant membership only to those who share their beliefs and missions).
204
For a more detailed critique of Ginsburg’s position, see GREG LUKIANOFF, UNLEARNING
LIBERTY: CAMPUS CENSORSHIP AND THE END OF AMERICAN DEBATE 10 (2012) (detailing how the
culture of censorship prevalent on most campuses has resulted in the failure of institutions of higher
learning to promote critical thinking in students).
205
Christian Legal Soc’y vs. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 3002 (2010) (Alito, J., dissenting).
206
Id.
207
Id. at 2992 (majority opinion).
208
Id.
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which they were free to set their own rules.209
C. Individual Desires v. Church Teachings
In the wake of Hosanna-Tabor, another concern over preserving
religious identity, however open-ended this concept may be viewed, focuses
in part on who can serve as religious leaders in faith-based institutions,
particularly churches and other charitable organizations. Coupled with
attempts to impose secular values on religious institutions via health care
mandates and challenges to institutional presence on campuses as evidenced
in CLS, it probably should come as no surprise, even though it would have
been incomprehensible a generation ago, that a federal agency (namely the
EEOC) would attempt to interfere in the internal operations of a faith-based
institution to delineate who can qualify as a religious minister.
The position of the EEOC in Hosanna-Tabor was astounding,
because the actions of its officials in supporting the teacher amounted to
questioning how ecclesiastical leaders define who qualifies to fill positions
as ministers, priests, rabbis, or other formal leadership positions, cuts to the
heart of what it means to lead religious institutions. In the process, the
EEOC’s Hosanna- Tabor perspective exacerbated the growing tension
between the desires of individuals or small groups, and the sincere, longheld beliefs of institutional churches by placing secular government officials
in the role of deciding who qualifies as religious leaders, trammeling the socalled “wall of separation.”
It promises to be interesting to observe how other issues and
scenarios are played out as well. For instance, what will happen if or when
someone initiates litigation against the Roman Catholic Church on such
bases as its refusal to ordain women or gays or its refusal to solemnize
unions between members of the same sex? Moreover, it remains an open
question whether governmental or public officials should have the authority
to meddle in matters essentially doctrinal in nature.
Rather than treat concerns about governmental intrusion into
doctrinal matters as a form of reduction to the absurd, it is worth
acknowledging incidents of this nature that have occurred. For instance, in
Canada, Human Rights Tribunals have sanctioned not only a Roman
Catholic priest for teaching that homosexuality is a sin and that marriage is a

209
Id. In a 1996 case of dubious precedential value in the wake of CLS, the Second Circuit
acknowledged that under the Equal Access Act, the students retained the right to select leaders who
complied with the Christian club’s religious standards and left the door open to the possibility that those
who disagreed with the group’s beliefs were free to form their own club. Hsu v. Roslyn Union Free Sch.
Dist., 85 F.3d 839, 862 (2d Cir. 1996). For a commentary on this case, see Charles J. Russo & Ralph D.
Mawdsley, Hsu v. Roslyn Union Free School District No. 3: An Update on the Rights of High School
Students Under the Equal Access Act, 114 EDUC. L. REP. 359 (1996).
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union between one man and one woman,210 but also a Christian pastor for
writing a letter to a local newspaper decrying the gay lifestyle, an order that
has since been affirmed judicially.211 In like fashion, in the United States,
controversies have arisen over whether religiously-affiliated K-12 schools
can be obligated to accept students living with parents who are in same-sex
unions,212 even though such a lifestyle violates the sincerely held religious
beliefs that are taught in these schools.
At the intersection of religious and secular life, at least three
disputes, and an emerging legislative issue, have arisen when companies
refused to serve individuals who were entering same-sex relationships
because they disagree on religious grounds. The first dispute involved a
private photographer in New Mexico who was adjudicated of having
violated state law because she refused to offer her services at the
commitment ceremony of a same-sex couple.213 Based on her religious
beliefs, the plaintiff refused to work as a photographer for the couple
because she disapproves of same-sex relationships.214 The photographer
maintained that forcing her to have to offer her services would violate her
rights to the free exercise of religion.215
On further review, the Supreme Court of New Mexico, in an
opinion trammeling religious freedom, rejected the photographer’s claims.216
The court declared, most notably, that the state Human Rights Act did not
violate either the photographer’s rights to Free Speech or the Free Exercise
Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution even
though she was made to act in a manner that was inconsistent with her
210

Bob Ellis, Homosexual Activists Driving Store out of Business, AMERICAN CLARION (Dec. 7,
2012), available at http://www.americanclarion.com/15186/2012/12/07/homosexual-activists-drivingstore-out-of-business/.
211
James Wood, Redford on Human-Rights Hot Seat, EDMONTON J., Nov. 12, 2012, at A4, available
at 2012 WLNR 23459464.
212
See, e.g., Evan Prieskop, Christian Preschool Boots Child of Gay Couple, COURTHOUSE NEWS
SERVICE (Dec. 14, 2012), http://www.courthousenews.com/2012/12/14/53132.htm; Dave Bohon,
Homosexual Couple Sues Christian Preschool for Rejecting Son as Student, THE NEW AMERICAN (Dec.
24, 2012), http://www.thenewamerican.com/culture/faith-and-morals/item/14013-homosexual-couplesues-christian-preschool-for-rejecting-son-as-student (involving a controversy in New Mexico); Erica
Meltzer, Denver Archbishop Defends Sacred Heart of Jesus' Decision on Lesbians' Children at Boulder
Preschool, DAILYCAMERA.COM (March 9, 2010), http://www.dailycamera.com/ci_14640646; Lisa
Wangsness, O’Malley Post Cites ‘Good of the Child’: Cardinal Backs Hingham Catholic School
Decision, Offers to Help Gay Couple, BOS. GLOBE, May 20, 2010, at 1, available at 2010 WLNR
10384021; see also Charlie Danaher, Tolerance Goes Both Ways, Boulder, DAILYCAMERA.COM (March
13, 2010), http://www.dailycamera.com/ci_14665405; Electra Draper, Chaput's Right-eous Stands,
DENVER POST, May 21, 2010, at A01, available at 2010 WLNR 10556648 (concerning a dispute in
Colorado).
213
Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 284 P.3d 428, 432 (N.M. Ct. App. 2012), cert. granted, 296
P.3d 491 (2012). For a news analysis of this case, see George Will, Advocates of Tolerance Sometimes
Turn Into Bullies, SPRINGFIELD (MO) NEWS-LEADER, Sept. 21, 2012, available at 2012 WLNR
20126772.
214
Elane Photography 284 P.3d at 432.
215
Id. at 432–33.
216
Elane Photography v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53, 77 (N.M. 2013), cert. petition filed, http://www.
adfmedia.org/files/ElanePhotoCertPetition.pdf (Nov. 8, 2013).
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sincerely held religious beliefs.
In a statement certainly leaving its author open to wide criticism and
rhetorical questions leading to results that the judge may not like, the
concurrence suggested that the plaintiffs:
[A]re compelled by law to compromise the very religious
beliefs that inspire their lives. Though the rule of law
requires it, the result is sobering. . . .
. . . A multicultural, pluralistic society, one of our
nation’s strengths, demands no less. The Huguenins
[plaintiffs] are free to think, to say, to believe, as they wish;
they may pray to the God of their choice and follow those
commandments in their personal lives wherever they lead.
The Constitution protects the Huguenins in that respect and
much more. But there is a price, one that we all have to pay
somewhere in our civic life.217
In chilling judicial over-reaching, this jurist maintained that the
judiciary has the authority to compel people of faith to compromise their
beliefs, thereby incredibly abnegating more than two-hundred years of
American jurisprudence concerning religious freedom. One can only
wonder what happened to basic American freedoms in the “multicultural,
pluralistic society” of which the judge wrote. Does he mean to say that
religious freedom exists as long as all believe in the same thing, namely
what the courts divine as appropriate?
The concurrence continued on to state:
[T]he [plaintiffs] have to channel their conduct, not their
beliefs, so as to leave space for other Americans who
believe something different. That compromise is part of the
glue that holds us together as a nation, the tolerance that
lubricates the varied moving parts of us as a people. That
sense of respect we owe others, whether or not we believe
as they do . . . . In short, I would say to the Huguenins, with
the utmost respect: it is the price of citizenship.218
In fairness, could not the same question have been asked of the
same-sex couple? In other words, could not the same-sex couple, rather
than put the photographer in an uncomfortable position, have employed
others who were willing to take pictures at their ceremony without having to
violate their beliefs? More to the point: why is it that people of faith are the
ones who are always expected to make the compromises with regard to their
217
218

Id. at 79–80 (Bosson, J., concurring).
Id. at 80.
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sincerely held religious beliefs? Why is it that compromise does not work
both ways? Why does “tolerance” of religious (or other) differences
ultimately place believers in the position of having to make the draconian
choice of being able to live out their values or be taken to court by illiberal
advocates of purported openness and diversity of opinion?
Rather than face a similar outcome, the owner of a trolley company,
whose firm in Baltimore made its vehicles available for hire as part of
wedding festivities, announced that it would forgo what had been a
profitable business activity. The owner decided to discontinue the
operations of his business rather than run the risk of having to serve samesex couples in the wake of a recently approved change in state law
legalizing such relationships.219
The third controversy arose in Washington. A florist faces litigation
from the State Attorney General for violating state laws against
discrimination and consumer protection220 as well as from the American
Civil Liberties Union221 under the same discrimination statute as in the first
claim for refusing to sell flowers to a couple that was about to enter a same
sex union because their lifestyle is inconsistent with her belief in Jesus
Christ.222
1. An Emerging Legislative Issue
While wholeheartedly decrying unlawful discrimination in any
form, a final emerging challenge to religious freedom, its uncertain status
notwithstanding, albeit of a legislative nature is unresolved as this article
heads to press. The Employment Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA), which
has been consistently introduced in Congress since 1994223 has yet to gain
passage.224 ENDA renders it illegal for organizations with fifteen225 or more
employees to “fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to the
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment of the
individual, because of such individual's actual or perceived sexual
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orientation or gender identity.”226
According to ENDA, “[t]he term 'gender identity' means the genderrelated identity, appearance, or mannerisms or other gender-related
characteristics of an individual, with or without regard to the individual's
designated sex at birth.”227 Further, ENDA states that “sexual orientation'
means homosexuality, heterosexuality, or bisexuality,”228 but fails to define
these terms or what guidelines may serve to limit “orientation” to these
descriptors.
ENDA raises concerns for the future of religious freedom because
although the bill purportedly offers exemptions to religious organizations
and employers with fewer than fifteen employees,229 it fails to offer BFOQs
like Title VII. As such, ENDA’s presumably good intentions aside, since
employers may well be subject to ambiguous terminology dealing with
sexuality, it remains to be seen how this act plays itself out if it becomes
federal law.
After rejecting an amendment intended to expand the protections
afforded to religious organizations, the Senate approved ENDA. The bill
does include a non-retaliation provision230 intended to protect religious
employers penalize or withhold licenses, permits, certifications,
accreditation, contracts, grants, guarantees, tax-exempt status, or any
benefits or exemptions from that employer, or to prohibit the employer’s
participation in programs or activities sponsored by that Federal, State, or
local agency.231 Speaker Boehner said that he would not bring ENDA up for
a vote in the House of Representatives.232
At the same time, in what may fall under the principle of unintended
consequences, should ENDA be enacted into law, it seems unlikely to
protect the rights of parents as they direct the education of their children in
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the face of governmental dictates with which they disagree.233 This lack of
concern for parental wishes may be especially evident for those who enroll
their children in faith-based schools in the hope of not having their young
subjected to potential fights over the viability of their beliefs, and those of
the institutions charged with educating their offspring, over adult sexuality
in what should be educational environments rather that locations serving as
laboratories for what is essentially social experimentation and engineering.
IV. CONCLUSION
To date, as reflected most recently in Hosanna-Tabor, the Supreme
Court clearly and unambiguously rejected the Administration’s argument
that a government agency, the EEOC, had the power to dictate qualifications
for ministers and other religious leaders insofar as it broadly deferred to
church authorities on this quintessentially religious matter.234 However, it is
unclear to what extent the United States Supreme Court is likely to continue
to protect religious liberty, whether under the ACA or nascent concerns as
represented by ENDA, under the religion clauses for those who allow their
faith to be their guide when they enter into public life, especially if their
values, regardless of whether they are deeply held religious beliefs, conflict
with the emerging orthodoxies of the day
As evidenced by the litigation surrounding the birth control
mandates of the ACA and the status of same-sex relationships that are in the
early stages of being played out even as the Supreme Court has addressed
the latter, the United States is clearly at a fork in the road. The way which
the nation turns at this fork suggests that the future of religious freedom in
the United States may well hang in the balance.
The question is thus whether the American government, more
particularly the executive and legislative branches, along with the judiciary,
can steady the course by continuing to respect religious freedom in allowing
believers to follow their consciences, which are rooted in their sincerely
held religious beliefs. In the alternative, the question becomes whether
politicians and jurists intend to take steps to blaze a new trail by requiring
people of faith to become subservient to those who are willing to move the
nation into a brave new secular world where religious freedom is
marginalized at best.
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